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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 4

DECEMBER, 1950

NUMBER 1

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF NEUROPSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY
IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES*
HUBERT WINSTON SMITH

t

INTRODUCTION

Need for Astringeiit Principles to Test Claims of Psychic Disability.Trial lawyers are well aware that fully 50 to 60%y of all civil litigation involves
some claim of physical or psychic disability.' Purely physical disabilities are
extremely difficult to evaluate 2 but when the allegedly disabling symptoms
are of psychic origin, wholly or in part, legal tribunals require the most
competent illumination the mental sciences 3 can provide if error and imposition are to be minimized. The purpose of the present presentation is not to
impugn the mental sciences but rather to ask whether any astringent principles exist for shrinking extravagant testimony. The intelligent counsel does
not aspire to annihilate and atomize every neuropsychiatric witness. Some of
these gentlemen are too learned and careful and veracious to be deeply eroded,
much less exploded, by astute cross-examination. But unfortunately, the
*This article is the revised and documented version of a talk given before the
Workmen's Compensation and Casualty Insurance Round Tables of the American Bar
Association in Washington, D. C., on September 19, 1950. It will appear also in the
Proceedings of the Insurance Round Tables of the American Bar Association.
t Professor of Law, College of Law; Professor of Legal Medicine, School of Medicine; Director, The Law-Science Program, The Tulane University of Louisiana. LL.B.,
1930, Harvard Law School; M.D., 1941, Harvard Medical School.
1. Dr. Harry L. Kozol found that during the year ending June 30, 1946, some2,165
tort cases were tried in Massachusets courts, of which an estimated 90% were claims for
personal injury requiring participation of physicians as expert medical witnesses and very
often testimony by neuropsychiatrists. Kozol, The Neuropsychiatrist and the Civil Law,
104 Am. J. PSYCHIAr. 535 (March, 1948). This figure did not include the large number
of medicolegal claims adjudicated under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. Baron Parke declared as long ago as 1847 in Armsworth v. South Eastern Ry., 11
Jur. 758, 759 (Eng. 1847) that: "It is impossible to form an estimate of the value of
human life either to a man himself or to others connected with him." Yet this did not
stop the courts from putting the burden upon the community conscience (the jury) or
finding the best possible answer in particular cases. See Smith, Psychic Interest in Contimation of One's Own Life: Legal Recognition and Protection, 98 U. oF PA. L. REv.
781 (1950).
3. Though we have used the convenient term "Neuropsychiatric Testimony" in our
title, this is for convenience only. More properly, we are dealing with the whole area of
the mental and behavior sciences, particularly as these habitually are brought into diagnostic and therapeutic cooperation in the hospital and clinic.

I
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supply of real experts i n the mental sciences is so small, 4 and the testimonial
need is so great, that quasi- and pseudo-experts are all too likely to gain
entrance to the witness box. It is essential that the defendant's lawyer be
armed aforehand with certain basic knowledge of mental sciences so that he
may use cross-examinatioi more effectively to expose extravagant claims.
Current Looseness of Judicial Practice in Qualifying Expert Witnesses
in the Mental Sciences.-The courts, generally, adopt the lenient fiction that
the possessor of an M.D. degree is automatically competent to testify as to
any phase of medical science, including such specialties as psychiatryU But
in every instance where organized medicine has set aside a particular area
as a discrete specialty, because prolonged study and special experience are
required to qualify practitioners in that area, it seems reasonable for the trial
judge to require similar special training of every witness who is to be certified
as an expert witness on that specialty. Unfortunately, this concept has not, as
yet, received the judicial approbation it deserves 6 but it is worthy of constant
reiteration, for the progress of thought may yet lead to its acceptance. 7
Constantly Press Homle the Fact that the ParticidarWitness Has Only
GeneralMedical Qualifications,Not the Requisite Expertness of a Specialist.Today a varied group of experts is functioning at the specialty level in relation to the mental sciences-namely, the psychiatrist, the neurologist, the
neurosurgeon, the neurophysiologist, the neuropathologist, the research psychologist, the clinical psychologist and the psychiatric social worker.
4. In 1946 there were 635,769 psychiatric patients in hospitals in the United States. At
that time there were 206,000 physicians in this country but only 4000 psychiatrists. Thus,
less than 2% of all physicians in the United States were psychiatrists. While there was
one physician to every 680 persons in the population, there was only one psychiatrist to
every 35,000 persons. PUBLIC PsyciaiAamc HosPITALS (Report No. 5 of Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry, April, 1948). A Survey conducted by the Chairman, Committee on Medical Education, the American Psychiatric Association, in 1946, addressed to
69 American and 9 Canadian medical schools, revealed that psychiatry was being taught as
a basic science in 35 of the schools, as a specialty in 8, and that there was a separate
Department of Psychiatry in 38, while 30 schools had no full-time teachers of psychiatry.
REPORT ON" MEDICAL EDUCATION No. 3 (Report No. 3 of Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry, March, 1948).
5. At this time the majority view seems to be that a physician or surgeon without
specialist training or experience, may nevertheless give expert opinion evidence concerning injuries to the nervous system, nervous disorders, and mental conditions (psychiatric
states), basing his testimony upon personal medical contact with the patient or upon
hypothetical questions. 2 WIGmoRE, EvIDlnNcE § 679 (3d ed. 1940) ; 11 R.C.L., Expert and
Opinion Evidence § 27 (1916) ; Note, 54 A.L.R. 860 (1928).
There is a perceptible swing, however, among American jurisdictions, to the minority
view thtt a physician or surgeon must qualify as an expert before he is competent to testify
on medical specialties, at least in cases where he has not been attending physician. Note,
54 A.L.R. 860, 866 (1928), citing decisions from Alabama, Maine and Mississippi.
6. Insofar as judicial reluctance to enforce so strict a test of competency is based upon
large need for expert witnesses and short supply, it would seem to be concession enough
to permit the attending physician to testify, without regard to his special qualifications.
7. Legal precedents from the turn of the century or earlier periods have lost force
through the altered complexion of medical practice and lush growth of medical specialization. Courts should take judicial notice that one result of this revolution in the practice
of medicine is that an appropriate specialist can generally be found within the vicinity of
the forum.
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If the plaintiff's medical witness is a family physician, he should always
be permitted to testify as to his examinations, diagnosis and treatment. Seek,
however, -on voir dire examination, through a friendly, firm approach, to
elicit from the physician a frank confession of his own limited knowledge
and experience concerning neuropsychiatry. He may be willing to say he
prefers to confine his testimony to the scope of the general practitioner or
that he prefers not to put his opinions on neuropsychiatric matters in competition with those of trained specialists. 8 Show, if need be, that he has never
held himself out in his community as a psychiatrist but, has referred such
patients to specialists or mental institutions for treatment. Recite to the witness,
for corroboration by him, the requirements for certification by the particular
medical specialty Board in Psychiatry and N'eurology, 9 and show that he
has not met these. Concede the fact, and have the witness agree, that to
measure up to expectations in his own field of practice has required the
physician's full time. Fix indelibly the nature and limits of this practice. If
the voir dire examination is searching and effective, the trial court may be
induced to rule that the expert qualifications of the witness extend to general
practice only, and not to neuropsychiatric subjects.' 0 Bear in mind, in this
connection, recent authority that the voir dire ruling of the trial judge is,
provisional only. The duty of the court is to maintain surveillance of expert
testimony throughout the trial. In his sound discretion, the judge may reverse
his preliminary ruling, substitute a finding that the supposed expert is not
qualified, dismiss him as a witness and order his completed testimony cancalled, should it appear during the course of trial that, he is not actually
competent to provide expert illumination of the issues before the court."
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE CRITIQUE FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY NECESSARILY DEPENDS UPON THE,
BASIC LEARNING AND PRINCIPLES OF THE MENTAL SCIENCES

The mental sciences play a conspicuous role in criminal law and in various
sorts of civil litigation. We are constrained here to focus our attention upon
problems of special concern to compensation and casualty insurance lawyers,
8. In Spaulding v. City of Edina, 122 Mo. App. 65, 97 S.W. 545 (1906), a general

practitioner was held by the court to be competent to testify concerning the plaintiff's
nervous condition despite his own confession: "I do not claim to be an expert on the
subject of nervous diseases." The general position taken was that it is for the court and
not for the witness to decide whether he has the requisite expert qualifications. Admitting it to be a judicial function to determine the competency of a proposed expert, what

better evidence could be had of his incapacity than his admission?
9. To qualify to take the examinations for certification by the Specialty Board in
Neurology or Psychiatry, the candidate must have completed three years full time, postgraduate study in an approved institution with two additional years of study or hospital
experience. To become eligible for the dxaminations in both Neurology and Psychiatry,
the candidate must have completed five years of full-time, post-graduate study, plus two
additional years of study or hospital experience.

10. See note 5, supra.
11. Carbonneau v. La Chance, 307 Mass. 153, 29 N.E.2d 696 (1940).
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namely, the vigorous testing of neuropsychiatric disabilities allegedly caused
by traumatic stimuli.
Vital Scientific Concepts Underlying Legal Medicine.-Experience demonstrates that all medical evidence adduced in civil litigation has logical
reference to one or more of four chief categories of problems, namely:
(1) Problems of Identification. Does the plaintiff have the disability
alleged? This raises questions of diagnosis, differential diagnosis, and malingering.
(2) Problems .of Causation. Was the plaintiff's present disability, if
any, primarily caused, or aggravated, by the traumatic episode alleged by
him as a basis of defendant's liability?
(3) Problems of Effects. What is the degree of disability (temporary,
permanent; partial, total?) and what are the legally compensable injuries
sustained by plaintiff, including past and present items and future items
reasonably certain to occur? The last consideration invokes medical prognosis.
(4) Problems of Rehabilitation. It is clear that a claimant has a duty
to minimize injuries, by accepting reasonable medical treatment and rehabilitation. The duty is enforced both in tort and workmen's compensation cases
though not always in its full equitable scope, and with more judicial reserve
12
shown where surgery is indicated than .where medical treatment is needed.
Today we are witnessing the rapid development of rehabilitation medicine as
a new specialty destined to cut across and to supplement existing medical
specialties and this science of minimizing disabilities of all sorts has tremendous
medicolegal implications.
Medical Signs and Symptoms; Necessity for Performance of Diffcrential Diagnosis; Conjectural Import of a Mere Symptom.-In the practice of
medicine, the physician considers it vitally important to establish the patient's
correct diagnosis so that he may apply the specific therapy needed to eliminate
the primary cause of the disabling symptoms. Too often, in personal injury
cases, the plaintiff's pleadings recite symptoms only, necessarily of conjectural
import if the origin is not identified in the form of one of the many accepted
medical diagnoses.
You may ask why medical symptoms are of conjectural value in arriving
at a just compensation. This follows from the fact that symptoms are the
subjective feelings described by the patient and that human beings can experience only a limited number of symptoms, whatever the disease or illness
from which they may be suffering-such symptoms, for instance, as headaches,
nausea, pain, dizziness, fatigue, malaise (discomfort), etc. In addition to
symptoms, a disease, injury or illness may produce a variable number of
signs, these being abnormal changes apparent to the skilled examiner without
12. See Ludlam, Plaintiff's Duty to Minimi;7e Defendant's Liability by Surgery, 17
TENN. L. REV. 821

(1943).
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description by the patient. Among such signs are swellings, reddened inflamed
surfaces, elevated temperature, abnormal findings in blood or urine or significant elevations or depressions of customary constituents, rapid pulse, abnormal
respiration, hyperactive, depressed or absent reflexes as contrasted with usual
findings upon examination of the nervous system-in brief, any objective
indication of altered function or structure of the human personality. As in
the case of symptoms, signs, too, are limited in number, with the result that
substantially the same signs and symptoms may be present in several different
disorders of markedly different import.
The task of determining the exact cause of particular signs and symptoms
when any one of several possible causes might be responsible for them,
arises regularly in establishing medical diagnosis. It requires the physician
to carry out what is known as a differential diagnosis, utilizing every species
of study, laboratory method, and special instrumentality or test, necessary to
uncover the decisive additional data which will permit alternative diagnostic
possibilities to be ruled out, one after another, until the true diagnosis is
reached and confirmed by positive and negative findings.
Every disease state or sickness has a diagnostic title or description and
a so-called differential diagnosis-that is to say, a list of other conditions
which may produce the same or similar signs and symptoms. These can be
discovered by reference to standard medical works dealing with diagnosis,
from treatises devoted to medical specialties and by conferences with competent medical specialists.' 3 It is surprising how few lawyers are tfamiliar with
these fundamental medical facts which would enable them to carry the medical
witness through a rigid cross-examination on the exact steps performed by
him in carrying out the differential diagnosis, thus testing both his diagnostic
acumen and the likelihood of his having reached the correct diagnosis in the
case at bar.14 All physicians should, but many do not, uniformly carry out a
differential diagnosis and in consequence many mistakes in diagnosis result.' 5
This can be very costly to the defendant, either through error of the medical
witness in ascribing symptoms of the plaintiff to a more serious disorder than
13. For general treatises on diagnosis, see CABOT AND ADAMS, PHYSICAL DIAGNOSIS
(13th ed. 1942); FRENCH (ed.), INDEX OF DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF MAIN SYMPTJIs
(6th ed. 1945). For examination of the nervous system, see MONRAD-KRoHN, CLINICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE NERvous SYSTEM (9th ed. 1949) ; SPURLING, PRACTICAL NEURO-

LOGICAL DIAGNOSIS (4th ed. 1950); Mm-ILER, MERRITT AND PUTNAM, CLINICAL NEURoLOGY (1947) ; WILSON, NEUROLOGY (Bruce ed. 1940). For an introduction to psychiatry,
see NoYEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYcHIATRY (3d ed. 1948); MENINGER, THE HUMAN
MIND (3d ed. 1949) (contains valuable selected bibliography covering the mental sciences).
For a more specialized work, see HUNT (ed.), PERSONALITY AND THE BEHAVIOR DIsORDERS (1944). For current medical and psychiatric literature, consult INDEX MEDIcus,
an alphabetically arranged, comprehensive index to be found in medical libraries.
14. Medical diagnosis, in obscure cases, or even in relatively simple situations, may
become difficult. This arises from the complexities of human beings, variability of disease,
and the limited number of signs and symptoms.
15. This is attested by the high percentage of errors discovered in diagnoses of referring physicians by large hospitals and, again, in the substantial percentage of error in
hospital diagnoses found at post-mortem examinations. As Sir William Osler is reputed to
have said, in therapy there are three important things: diagnosis, diagnosis, and diagnosis.
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he actually has, or in attributing to one traumatic episode symptoms which
actually are due to an independent disease or injury.
To emphasize and illustrate this important subject of diagnosis, differential diagnosis and the conjectural import of symptoms, we may consider
the common complaint of headaches. Medically, we know that headaches may
be due to a large variety of dissimilar causes of totally different import in
point of treatment, prognosis, and disability. Thus a headache may be due
to overindulgence in alcohol and soon pass away; or it may be due to migraine,
or to infectious disease, or to head injury, or to syphilis of the central nervous
system, or to an inexorably progressing brain tumor, to name only some of
16
the many possible causes.
Example. A medical witness attributed plaintiff's headaches to a head injury.
On cross-examination, defendant compelled the physician to admit that such headaches
could be produced by syphilis of the central nervous system. He was prepared to
prove by'other evidence that plaintiff received medical treatment for such syphilis both
before and after the accident.1

Could the Cause-Effect (Stimulus-Response) Relationship Hypothesized
by Plaintiff Possibly Occur? Did It Probably Occur in tire Case at Bar?In the areas of Iforensic psychiatry involving traumatic injuries, it is manifest
that we-are concerned with what sorts of stimuli are recognized to be capable
of producing what sorts of responses. We want to know:
(1) Does -science recognize the possibility that such stimulus as that
to which plaintiff 3vas exposed can produce the disability of which he
complains ?
(2) If such a cause-effect sequence could occur, did it probably take
place in the case at bar?
Varieties of Traumatic Stimuli and Neuropsychiatric Disabilities.-In
probing these ultimate questions, one is thrown straightway into an analysis
of the varieties of stimuli which may be applied and the neuropsychiatric
disabilities which might be claimed to have resulted therefrom. Without intending to imply actual relationships, we may classify traumatic stimuli and
neuropsychiatric disabilities as follows:
TRAUMATIC STImUI

1. Direct physical impact
2. Physical impact at one site, injurious effect at another, made possible by a transmission mechanism:
1) Transmission via blood stream;
2) Transmission via nervous system;

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC

1. Detectible organic
ei
lesion
or

DISABILITIES

Head injuries (and
their sequelae)
Injuries to peripheral
nerves, spinal cord or
in
br
brain.
Causation or aggravation of organic disease of the nervous
system.

16. See note 13, supra. See also, PAIN (Volume 23 of the Research Publications
of the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, containing Proceedings
of the Associatiofi on December 18 and 19, 1942).
17. Wells v. City of Jefferson, 345 Mo. 239, 132 S.W.2d 1006 (1939).

1950 ]

NEUROPSYCHIA TRIC TESTIMONY
TRAUMATIC STIMULI

NsuROPSYCHIATRIC DIsABILms

3) Transmission through intervening tissues
3. Intense emotional stimulus (Such
as great and sudden fear, or grief)

Traumatic psychoses

2. Functional' ( p s y chological)
di s order with or
without ascertaina b 1 e organic I esion

Aggravation of preexisting psychoses or
neuroses.
Traumatic neuroses
_
and
Physiological
psychological effects
of intensive emotional
stimulation: "nervous
shock" and causation,
or aggravation, of independent d i s ea s e
(psychostates
somatic medicine)

Further About Physical and Emotional Trauma, and Organic and PsychologicalDisabilities;Effects Upon Problems of Proof and the Permanency
of the Injury.-In order further to simplify these matters, one may think of
stimuli as being of two sorts: (1) injurious blows to bodily tissues, or
(2) intense emotional stimuli seen or heard by the subject which set in motion
within him interacting physiological changes and psychological chain reactions.
Turning to effects, or disabilities, we may sort these into:
(1) Those due to demonstrable injury of the nervous system: as where
a peripheral nerve is severed, the spinal cord is cut or the brain is contused
or lacerated.
(2) Those due partially to organic lesions and partially to psychological
reactions aroused in the victim.
(3) Those where no organic injury can be found to account for the
victim's symptoms so that the supposition is held that the disability is purely
psychological (i.e., functional or psychogenic).
We shall have occasion to repeat and elaborate upon this analysis of
traumatic stimuli and neuropsychiatric disabilities as our discussion progresses.
Just now, it is vitally important to appreciate that tangible evidence of various
sorts should exist and reasonably may be required to prove organic injuries
of the nervous system, while the patient's symptoms and clinical history will
be the sole evidence available to establish psychological disabilities. To put it
another way, organic injuries of the nervous system involve visible or demonstrable lesions, and produce resultant physical signs diagnostically, as well as
symptoms, whereas psychological disabilities involve symptoms only without
discoverable abnormality or change in the nervous system.'
18. In brief, whatever physiological changes may be involved, no injury or impairment
of an organ can be detected by the diagnostic means now available.
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Important consequences hang upon this differentiation of organic lesions
and psychological disabilities, namely:
(1) The problem of proof is simpler and the risks of exaggeration and
malingering are less where organic lesions are demonstrable; they are greater
where psychological disabilities are involved.
(2) While severed peripheral nerves may regenerate if the nerve sheath
remains,' 9 there is no effective regeneration of destroyed nervous tissue in
the spinal cord or brain. 20 Recovery, therefore, is by way of compensation
mechanisms and the victim may have a permanent disability, partial or total.
By way of contrast, psychological disabilities may be reversed completely by
proper treatment of the psyche and they are not entitled to be considered as
permanent injuries.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED
NEUROPSYCHIATRIc DISABILITY: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The medical area with which we are concerned is so large that extensive
articles and books might justifiably be devoted to the intrinsic learning of
the particular segments we propose to cover here. But this -forbidding obstacle
which lies in the way of presenting a comprehensive didactic treatment only
sharpens the challenge of bringing home to court and lawyer the vital first
principles which command and control subordinate minutiae. We shall seek
here to provide a strategic plan for testing and sifting the plaintiff's medical
case while referring in appropriate footnotes to readily available general
treatises from which more extensive expositions of purely medical phases
may be had.
(1) Require plaintiff by special motions or exceptions, to plead his disability with particularity, pushing him to a statement of medical diagnosis
where he has pleaded symptom.s only.
Notice of the medical character of the plaintiff's alleged disability is a
sine qua non both to defendant's preparation of his case and to scientific
calculation of just compensation at trial. Vague, rambling symptomatic allegations which fail to reveal underlying causes in terms of standard medical
diagnosis, should not be permitted to stand against defendant's special exceptions or pre-trial motions for particularization and to make more definite
and certain.
19. The rate of regeneration seems to vary between 0.5 to 3.6 mm. per day in the
ulnar nerve of the upper extremity; from 0.5 to 2.0 mm. per day in the median nerve,

upper extremity, and, according to some authors, as high as several mm. per day in certain other nerves. See Davis and Perrett, PeripheralNerve Injuries, in 3 PROGRESS IN
NEUROLOGY AND PSYcHIATRY, 303 (1948).
20. Recent experimental work shows that while some regeneration of fibers may
occur in the central nervous system, these are choked out in the process of repair by
vigorously growing fibrous tissue.

1950o]

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY

In like manner, defendant should move to require a more definite and
2
certain description by plaintiff of the alleged traumatic episode ' for the
adequacy of the causal stimulus to produce the disability imputed to it may
well become a sharply contested issue.
21. Dr. Brock has stressed the importance of an adequate History and Record of
Accident in these words:
"In a case of accident, the history that is elicited by most physicians is much too
casual and often too inadequate; the same may be said of the records kept by physicians.
It must be realized that the history and record, including progress notes, laboratory data
and operative findings in cases of accident are likely to become part of legal evidence,
and for this reason have great importance. If more than one history has been given at
different times, the physician must find out if they correspond in all essential details. If
there are discrepancies, they should be noted. Some uncertainties in the history may be
due to faulty memory; on the other hand, a very smooth narration may be the result of
coaching. In the case of a fall, how far did the victim fall? What part of his body received the impact and what kind of a surface did he land on? If he was hit by a falling
object, how far did it fall, what was its shape and consistency, and how much did it
weigh? In cases of head injury, was the head moving or stationary? Contre-coup
intracranial injuries are apt to occur in those whose heads are in motion at the time of
the blow's impact. The question of unconsciousness is of considerable importance. Was
the patient able to maintain the upright position or did he drop to the ground? How long
was the patient unconscious; when was he fully aware of all that was going on about
him? If the patient was delirious, how long was he in this state? What did the patient
remember last before the accident happened? It is important to fix the time period of
the retrograde and anterograde amnesias. Was the patient just groggy and dazed; was he
able to go home or to a doctor's office alone, or was assistance necessary? What did the
patient do upon reaching home or hospiatl? Did he vomit? If there was vomiting of
blood, had it been swallowed or was it evidence of injury to other viscera? Was there
orificial bleeding? If from the mouth, was the bleeding from cuts on the lips, tongue,
cheek or gum? If from the ear, was it from the auricle, external canal, or a ruptured
ear drum? If from the nose, was it due to local tissue injury? All these facts must he
taken into consideration before concluding that orificial bleeding is due to a fracture in
the anterior fossa (bleeding from the nose), middle fossa (bleeding from the ear) or
base (bleeding from mouth or pharynx). Was there escape of a clear fluid (cerebrospinal
fluid) from nose or ear? If a "black" eye developed, was it present immediately or did it
come on hours later, as happens in fractures of the anterior fossa. If there are other
evidences of ecchymoses, as about the mastoid, the time of their appearance should be
noted.
"Scalp Lacerations.In regard to scalp lacerations, one should note how deep they are
and how extensive, whether they are infected or not, how many stitches were needed and
whether drainage was necessary, and whether or not tetanus antitoxin was given. Lacerations of the face are especially important because of later aesthetic damage; this also
applies to the loss or injury of teeth.
"Skull Fracture.An attempt should be made to determine if any of the facial bones are
broken and if there is a fracture of the skull, is it simple or compound, linear, comminuted
or depressed? If compound, does the fracture go through a sinus, and if so, is there a previous history of sinusitis? If the crack goes through the mastoid process, it might be of great
importance to know whether there is an old history of middle ear disease. The taking of
x-rays should always be deferred until shock and similar complications have passed.
"Rigidity of the neck should be looked for and if found, lumbar puncture may reveal
a bloody spinal fluid which indicates some degree of laceration of the brain or its envelopes. If lumbar puncture reveals bloody spinal fluid, is it due to an intracranial iujury
or to an 'traumatic tap'? In the first case, the fluid is blood-tinged in all tubes equally, in
the latter, successive tubes reveal clearer fluids.
"The physician must also examine the long bones and the thoracic and abdominal
walls and the contained viscera to determine if injuries of these parts coexist.
"A careful record of temperature, pulse, respiration and blood pressure and cerebrospinal fluid pressure (if lumbar puncture was done) should be kept, and a most careful
observation of the degree of stupor and coma. Is stupor deepening? If so, how long after
the accident is this taking place? Is the deepening stupor accompanied by focal signs
such as hemiplegia, and is there a coexistent papilledema?" Brock, General Considerations
in Injuries of the Brain and Spinal Cord and Their Coverings, in BROCK (ed.), INJUIES
OF THE BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD AND THEIR CovRINcGS 2-3 (3d ed. 1949).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL,. 4

(2) Utilize all available means of pre-trial investigation and discovery
to determine plaintiff's state of health prior to the alleged traumatic episode.
Was he already suffering from poor or impaired health so that his present
condition could, at best, be only partially due to the alleged traumatic episode?
Experienced counsel will recall cases where the entire disability (such
as loss of vision in an eye) existed prior to the episode alleged and was in no
respect due to it. When incontrovertible evidence of this sort can be had,
blow the plaintiff up on the ground of fraudulent imposition, by surprise,
under your general denial.22 Pave the way by forcing plaintiff's medical
witness to admit that he is giving an opinion only as to the nature and degree
of plaintiff's disability and that he does not profess to know when or how it
was caused. Commit him to assertions that walking, running, working or
other sorts of functioning are impossible because of plaintiff's disability, then
force him to confess that, if in fact plaintiff has been performing these acts,
the doctor's medical diagnosis and prognosis are wrong. Ask him if any such
proof would not be squarely contrary to the claims of disability plaintiff made
to the witness (his physician), thus implying malingering.
More often, the plaintiff will not be guilty of such extreme fraud or
'imposition, but will be in the attitude of putting his best foot forward, consciously or unconsciously minimizing impairment which existed in his health
prior to the traumatic episode. It is important for the defendant to fix an
accurate base-line of plaintiff's pre-existing health as quickly as possible.
Positive evidence of pre-existing impaired health has value both for settlement purposes and for minimizing jury verdicts. It is a well settled principle
of the law of torts and damages that once a defendant has been culpably
connected with plaintiff's injury,2 he cannot mitigate his damages by proving
that plaintiff's unknown idiosyncrasy, poor health or pre-existing disease
caused his injurious response to be greater than a person of average health
would have suffered. 24 But this rule does not permit plaintiff to add to
defendant's liability ior damages an allowance for pre-existing bad health in
no way caused by defendant.

22. It is usually best to commit the plaintiff and his witness to categorical professions
of lost function before bringing on evidence which conclusively shows an opposite state of
facts to exist.
23. Culpable connection is important in tort cases though not in workmen's compensation law; there, it is enough for the claimant to prove that he has sustained a personal
injury from an accident arising out of, and in the course and scope of, his employment.
Horovitz, Modern Trends in Workinez's Compensation, 21 IND. L.J. 473 (1946), a study
in the Second National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine.
24. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747, 43 L.R.A. 832 (1899):
Purcell v. St. Paul Ry.; 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034, 16 L.R.A. 203 (1892); Note, 11

A.L.R. 1119, 1124 (1921).
(2).

See Digests, Damages, Key Nos, 33, 95, 132 (3), 168 and 208
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What part of plaintiff's injury represents compensable aggravation, and
what part non-compensable poor health antedating the accident must be
established to prevent blurring or neglect of this differentiation.
Example. Flood v. Smith5 illustrates this problem of separating noncompensable
from compensable factors. As the result of an automobile collision caused by negligence
of D, P, and P2 sustained injuries in excess of those an average person would have
suffered from a like stimulus. Defendant was able to show that two years previoasly,
P1, a 28-year-old man, was hurt in an automobile accident, sustaining a fracture' of the
skull and injury of his nervous system, from which he made a-substantial interim recovery. P2, his companion, was a 70-year-old library cataloguer. Her medical history
revealed that prior to the accident, she had undergone two nervous breakdowns and the
surgical removal of a cancerous breast. In the instant accident, Pi and P2 sustained
bruises and suffered extreme nervous shock, in P-s case aggravated by her morbid
fears that a blow received at the site of her amputated breast would reactivate her cancer.

(3) Make a careful study of the complete diagnostic methods and instrumentalities customarily used in evaluating the type of injury and disability.
claimed by plaintiff. Show, if possible, that many necessary and indicated
procedures have been omitted, or have not been carried out by accredited,
experts.
a. A thoroughgoing clinical examination should have been made of
plaintiff, covering his past medical, social and occupational history, and including a systematic physical examination of his main organ systems. 2 6
b. In all cases of alleged neuropsychiatric disability, a general neurological
examination should be carried out, searching for characteristic signs and
symptoms of organic injury to peripheral nerves, to the spinal cord and to
the brain.27 Various special examinations should be carried out according to
the nature of the injury under investigation.2 8
c. Where psychological symptoms may be present, a- complete psychiatric
examination must be done which presupposes prior completion of the above
examinations, and must necessarily extend into past medical and social history
and psychic conflicts as well as present complaints.20
d. In maniy cases, as in appraising post-traumatic 'symptoms (such as
headaches, dizziness, impaired concentration, loss of interest, diminished
energy or stamina, generalized weakness, gastric complaints, and emotional
difficulties) appering in the late course of head injuries, it becomes important
to recruit the aid of the psychologist. Intelligence, verbal and performance
25. 126 Conn. .644, 13 A2d 677 (1940).
26. The objective here is to uncover any pre-existing disease or state of poor health.
27. Briefly, this involves testing the presence or absence of sensation to hot, cold,
pressure and pain, the testing of the various reflexes and other examinations calculated to
show up loss or change of function. For the detailed procedures involved in a systematic
examination of the nervous system, see references, note 13 supra.
28. As, for instance, lumbar puncture; electro-diagnosis; radiological (X-ray) studies
of the skull and central nervous system; electroencephalography (brain Wave studies)
etc.
29. This is very important because of the intrinsic continuity of personality.
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examinations,3" and certain projective techniques 31 may be of vital importance in determining whether these symptoms are due to organic injury of
the nervous system, or flow from psychological (neurotic) mechanisms and
32
so should be rated as more femporary in prospective duration.

e. It is customary practice in head injury cases, to obtain specimens of
spinal fluid by the riskless procedure of lumbar puncture,3 3 to ascertain
whether the pressure is abnormally high and whether blood is detectible in
the fluid, this being an
plates of the skull and
termine the presence of
of one or both temples,

indication of hemorrhage. A proper series of X-ray
vertebral column may be required routinely, to defractures, and exploratory trephining3 4 in the region
to allay suspicion of suspected blood clots (sub-dutral

hematomas). The making of serial electroencephalograms (brain wave studies)
at intervals following a serious head injury may be necessary or helpful to
gauge resultant disturbances of brain function and to estimate more accurately
the risks of future traumatic epilepsy.3 5
The foregoing account is by no means intended as a complete inventory
of diagnostic procedures which may be called for by current medical standards
in reaching a well supported diagnosis or prognosis. If the plaintiff's claim is

for large damages, as is usually true in case of neuropsychiatric disabilities,
defendant should avail himself of the counsel of expert consultants in the

appropriate scientific specialties, asking them to make an inventory of requisite
studies which must be carried out to arrive at substantiated expert opinions

concerning plaintiff's diagnosis and prognosis.aa
30. Denny-Brown, Intellectual DeteriorationResulting from Head hijury,, in TRAUMA,\
467 (volume 24 of the Research Publications of the
Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, containing Proceedings of the
Association on Dec. 17-18, 1943) ; Cole, Intellectual Impairment in Head Injury, in id.
473; Halstead, Brain Injuries and the Higher Levels of Consciousness, in id. 480;
Ruesch, Harris and Bowman, Pre- and Post-TraumaticPersonality it Head Injuries, in id.
507; Hunt, The Uses and Abuses of Psychometric Tests, 35 Kr. L. J. 38 (1946) ; Halpern,
OF THE CENTRAL NERvous SYSTEm

The Rorschach Test and Other Projective Technics, in 3 PRoRESS IN NEUROLOGY AND
PSYCHIATRY 540 (Spiegel ed. 1948) ; BELL, PROJECTIVE TECHNIcS (1948) ; FRANK, PRo-

(1948).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Lumbar puncture: The patient is put in proper position, lying on one side with
his back arched. The physician injects a little novocain at the site of the intended puncture
to deaden the pain. A larger needle is then thrust into the spinal canal between the third
and fourth lumbar vertebrae (small of the back). The spinal cord is not injured because
it does not extend so low, but the examiner is able to obtain a sample of the cerebrospinal
fluid and by means of a special manometer, to measure the pressure of fluid of the spinal
canal, deducing therefrom the pressure in the cranial cavity. The fluid is examined for
the presence of blood and other pathological findings.
34. Removal of a circular disk or button of bone from the skull.
35. Gibbs, Medicolegal Aspects of Electroencephalography, 24 CAN. B. REV. 359
(1946).
36. Diagnosis has to do with present conditions; prognosis with future course and
outcome. The latter is necessarily more speculative than the former because unforseeable
complications may occur.
JEcTIE METHODS
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(4) It is desirable for defendant to go as far as local law perits in
bringing about plaintiff's complete nedical and psychological study in advance
of trial.
Aside from the obvious advantages of pre-trial discovery in preparing
one's direct and cross-examination, sharp illumination of plaintiff's pretraumatic and post-traumatic condition may materially aid the defendant in
effecting a favorable compromise settlement. Furthermore, this knowledge is
valuable in preventing disabilities due to independent accidents or disease
37
from being tacked onto the damages sought from the defendant.
(5) Where diagnosis of the neuropsychiatric disability of plaintiff depends in whole, or in part, upon past history of the patient's mzoods and
behavior, force this fact into the open. Require medical witnesses for plaintiff
to admit, if possible, that they have no personal knowledge of the truth pr
falsity of this diagnostic data,yet have relied on the hearsay materialin arriving

at their opinions.
In psychiatry, as in the diagnosis of heart conditions (cardiology), the

past medical and social history of the patient is of prime importance and the
psychiatrist is loath to make a diagnosis or prognosis without the illumination
which they afford. This so-called longitudinal study of behavior problems is

indispensable to the exercise of sound judgment. Usually the history of a
mental patient's alleged hallucinations, 38 delusions, 39 illusions, 40 mood disturbances and aberrant behavior, will come to the doctor second or third
hand, in the generality of cases being derived from friends or members of

the family and being reduced to writing by the psychiatric social worker. In
many states, the law will not permit the psychiatrist, testifying in court, to
rest his diagnosis upon such hearsay material. 4 1 The approach here should
37. The facts in Hunter v. Fleming, 7 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. App. 1928), illustrate this
risk. On June 29, 1925, P, a married woman, was with her husband in the family car when
it stopped dead on a streetcar track. D's conductor could see the stalled automobile 200
ft. away, but he continued to approach at a speed of 12 to 15 m.p.h. P screamed and
waved her arms, but a slight collision occurred. This modest impact caused P to
sustain superficial head injuries and a few bruises but no objective injuries of any consequence. Thereafter, P developed nervous symptoms consistent with neurasthenia but
proof of cause-effect relationships revealed that on Jan. 28, 1927, P had suffered a miscarriage. The examining physician attributed to this latter cause, part of the symptoms
of which P complained at the time of trial. And see Gannon v. S. S. Kresge, 114 Conn.
36, 157 Atl. 541 (1931), where post-accident causes were undoubtedly responsible for a
miscarriage occurring 5% months after the episode which produced hysteria.
38. Hallucination:a false sensory impression for which there is no external stimulus.
It may occur with relation to any of the special senses. A patient, for example, may hear
voices, but no one is speaking. He may have visions when there is nothing actually to
see. His experiences are thus purely subjective.
39. Delusion: a false belief definitely out of keeping with the individual's training,
experience and cultural background.
40. Illusion: a distorted or misinterpreted sensory impression which, in contradistinction to an hallucination, arises from an actual stimulus. Real objects are seen or
actual sounds are heard, but their true nature is mistaken or distorted. The patient may
perceive a crack in the floor as a snake or a shadow on the wall may appear to him to be
an animal.
41. For collected cases, see Note, 175 A.L.R. 274 (1948).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL. 4

be to induce plaintiff's psychiatric witness to admit that a knowledge of this
past history was an essential part of his reasoning in arriving at his diagnosis
and prognosis. If this can be adequately established, it then may be possible,
in some jurisdictions, to have the witness's testimony on direct examination
struck out as resting on hearsay evidence. In any event, the hearsay character
of substantial and influential parts of the diagnostic material is certain to
shake jury confidence. In lecturing to psychiatric social workers, we stress
the great importance of indicating in histories, the primary sources of all
information so that these individuals may be brought into court to lay a foundation for psychiatric opinions should the need arise.
Example. The writer was once called to the courthouse in a large city and was
much surprised to find that an elderly gentleman had been incarcerated in jail for a
week and was about to be tried for lunacy. The jury was actually in the box but the
court delayed trial while a conversation was held with the psychiatrist for the state.
He said that the individual in question had marked delusions of persecution, believing
that he was required by his family to sleep in the basement with six little dogs; that his
wife was.squandering family finances by feeding 125 pigeons, each of which she had
* named; that he saw people in the room who did not in fact exist and that when found
- on the occasion in question, he had locked himself in the bathroom with an axe, believing
that d Negro bootlegger was coming to get him. Inquiry showed that the psychiatrist
.had not made any independent investigation to determine whether these unusual stories
related by the immediate family were true or false. The court granted a ten day
continuance and during that time investigation revealed almost incredible facts. It was
possible to show through handwriting experts that the client's daughter and son-in-law
had forged deeds to some of his property, conveying it to themselves. The son-in-law,
one of the chief complaining witnesses, was considered to be a psychopathic personality,
having been temporarily locked up by local police upon infraction of the law and claiming afterward that he had been beaten black and blue during his incarceration. Careful
investigation showed there was no foundation to his claims. The client's wife did, in
fact, have 125 pigeons and was using large sums of money to feed them, as a visit to
the premises proved. The client was being required to sleep in the basement with six
-little dogs. A lodger in the home was willing to bear witness that the client was the
object of a contrived plan to "put him away" as he had passed his palmy days as a
contractor and was now in the way around the home. He had seen members of the
family purposely suggest that someone was in the room with client, when in fact no
one was there. They would then say: "Oh, don't you see him? Then you must be
crazy."
When this material was brought to court, the psychiatrist quickly found that the
individual in question had made a "complete social recovery" and did not need to be
committed. The charges against him were dropped. The evidence showed, among
other things, that the old gentleman, having guilt feelings about drinking bootlegged
whisky, had bought a certain drug at a nearby drugstore, and had taken a large overdose of it hoping thereby to break himself of his desire for intoxicants. The drug
was ' one which could produce hallucinations. It was during this time that he locked
himself up in the bathrooni with the axe believing what his family told him, namely that
the Negro bootlegger was coming to "get" him.

This instance reveals strikingly how bizarre symptoms of behavior
imputed to a patient nevertheless need closest investigation and independent
corroboration. As a usual matter, the statements of near relatives are accepted
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at face value by examining psychiatrists. Erroneous historical data pose a
grave danger to the accuracy of psychiatric diagnosis, for the examiner may
be led thereby to a mistaken conclusion that an individual has paranoia
(delusions of persecution) or other psychopathology, 42 there being in fact a
rational explanation for the patient's behavior.
In view of the foregoing considerations, defendant's counsel should do
everything possible to determine from primary sources, the true facts relative
to plaintiff's past symptomatology and behavior. 43
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY:

HEAD

INJURY CLAIMS

(1) Did the Plaintiff'sHead Sustain-a Traumatic Impact?
Search out details of the alleged traumatic episode; raise all possible
doubts as to the occurrence of head impact, capitalize in so far as possible
upon the want of corroborating evidence of eye witnesses, the absence of
visible scars and aftereffects, and plaintiff's failure to search for medical
treatment within a reasonable time after the alleged injury.
.
(2) Require plaintiff in his pleading and evidence to follow a descriptive
classification of head injuries claimed;as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Injuries
Injuries
Injuries
Injuries
General

of the scalp, skull and facial bones;
to the nerves of the head and neck;
to the blood vessels-of the skull;
to the brain;
nervous phenomena.
(3) What, if any, injuries did plaintiff sustain to the scalp, skull and
facial bones?
Injuries of the scalp provide objective evidence that force has been
applied to the head; the nature of the wound may indicate the direction in
which the traumatic force was travelling and the character of the instrument
or object that produced it. Press home the point, however, that a person may
collapse from epilepsy, heart attacks, spontaneous intracranial hemorrhage,
diabetic coma, or other causes producing sudden unconsciousness and that
plaintiff may have bruised or lacerated his scalp in a fall resulting from such
causes not attributable to the defendant or to an accident. 44
42, Psychopathology: mental abnormality or disorder involving substantial deviations
from usual intellectual or emotional equilibrium.
43. Cross-examination of plaintiff regarding his failure to see a physician promptly
has been held proper as contradicting plaintiff's testimony of the seriousness of his injury.
Giraney v. Oregon Shortline R.R. Co., 54 Idaho 535, 33 P.2d 359 (1934). It is also
permissible to show by cross-examination that plaintiff did not file a claim for injury or
medical expense under an accident or disability insurance policy he had in force at the
time of his alleged traumatic injury. Brock v. Cato, 42 S.E.2d 174 (Ga. App. 1947). See
also Western & A.R.R. v. Peterson, 168 Ga. 259, 147 S.E. 513 (1929).
44. This approach, of course, is more effective where independent evidence can be adduced that the plaintiff has suffered in past from a medical ailment capable of producing
sudden loss of consciousness.
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(4) Did plaintiff sustain a fracture of the skull?
The chief varieties of such fractures are:
a. Simple crack or fissure: Such a fracture in the vault of the skull is
not of itself serious, healing within a few months without pain. Fissures
which penetrate walls of air sinuses may tear the coverings (teninges) which
surround the brain and watery discharge of cerebrospinal fluid from the
nose (rhinorrhea) may occur; infection may extend from nose to meninges
and cause meningitis.45 Or at other locations, linear fractures may tear
(lacerate) cranial nerves '; causing blindness, deafness, facial paralysis or
double vision, or may tear a blood vessel such as the middle meningeal artery
(which runs in a bony channel on the inner surface of the skull) causing
hemorrhage. The brain and spinal cord are closely invested by a covering
membrane called the pia mater; next, separated by a small space, comes the
arachnoid mater and outermost, is the covering membrane called the dura
mater. Escaping blood is likely to get into the cerebrospinal fluid which circulates around brain and spinal cord (between the arachnoid mater and the
pia mater). Fractures of the sharp, irregular surfaces at the base of the skull
may lacerate (cut) cranial nerves or cause hemorrhage with bleeding from
the ear.
b. Comminuted fracture: Here the fractured bone is broken into pieces;
such fractures are dangerous because the fragments may tear the brain
coverings (meninges) and blood vessels and lacerate (cut) the brain.
c. Depressed fracture: Here part of the fractured bone is driven inward
with consequent danger that a bony fragment may tear the coverings
(meninges) surrounding the brain and lacerate (cut) the latter, and/or
various of the intra-cranial blood vessels.
d. Compound fracture: This is the term applied to a fracture which
produces an open communication between underlying tissues and the external
air. Compound fractures create risks of bacterial contamination and infection.
e. Mere depression of an area of bone in the cranial vault: This is not
necessarily a disabling injury or dangerous occurrence. A person may have a
saucer-shaped depression 4 inches in diameter and 2 inch deep for many
years without ill effect; 4 7 the important question is whether the dura mater
lining the skull has been torn by a sharp edge of bone jutting inward-greatly
48
increasing the risk of the possible development of traumatic epilepsy.
45. Meningitis: inflammation of the meninges, the coverings which surround the
brain and spinal cord.
46. Cranial nerves: peripheral nerves connected with the brain; they are arranged in
twelve pairs, most of which escape from the cranium through various openings to reach
the parts of the body they supply.
47. Denny-Brown, Factorsof Importance in Head Injury, 29 VA. L. REV. 811 (1943),
also in 1 CLINICS 1405 (1943).

48. Ibid.
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(5) Seek an admission from plaintiff's physicians that fracture of the
skull is not necessarily of serious import and is not, alone, adequate to prove
organic injury of the brain.
It is important to remember that severe and even fatal damage to the
brain may be sustained without significant injury to the scalp or skull. 49
Conversely, the scalp or skull may be extensively damaged without injury
to the brain. Defendant should insist on affirmative evidence of organic injury
to the nervous system. Force plaintiff's medical witnesses to admit that simple
linear fractures of the skull are not alone of serious import and are not proof
of injury to the brain. Make them agree that additional corroboration is
required to prove organic injury to the central nervous system. At the present
time, lay jurors are often misled into overestimating the severity of a head
injury by exhibiting to them X-ray plates showing a linear fracture of
plaintiff's skull. 0
(6) Show by cross-examination of plaintiffs physicians that the criteria
of head injury sufficient to produce organic (structural) change in the brain
have not been satisfied.
These criteria are as follows:
"A. Absolute criteria:
(a) Roentgen [X-ray] evidence-skull fracture
(b) Bloody spinal fluid
(c) Bleeding from the orifices (nose and ears)--especially from the ears
(d)Focal cerebral palsies [i.e. paralyses]
"B. Presumptive criteria in the order of their importance:
(e) Convulsive states, proved to be post traumatic
(f) Ventricular distortion, proved to be post traumatic [each hemisphere of the
brain contains a cavity or ventricle in which cerebrospinal fluid is produced; a shifting of the normal position of the ventricles, or distortion
of their contours, shown by X-ray, points to likely abnormality]
(g) History of prolonged unconsciousness
(h) History of adequate trauma [injurious impact], with especial consideration of the occurrence of vomiting following the injury."'
All too often, a picture of grave head injury and damage to the brain,
with impending epilepsy and even insanity, is built up by plaintiff's physicians
49. Moritz, The Mechanisms of Head Injury, 23 B.U.L. REV. 189 (1943), also in 117
ANN. SuRG. 562 (1943).
50. Such X-ray films are admissible in evidence, Scott, X-ray Pictures as Evidence,
44 MicH. L. REv. 773 (1946), and they have the special persuasive value inherent in
demonstrative exhibits. Futhermore, they can be carried into the jury room. Cooney v.
Hughes, 310 11. App. 371, 34 N.E.2d 566 (1941); Becker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 124 Pa. Super. 138, 188 Atl. 400 (1937). In Marland Ref. Co. v. McClung,
102 Okla. 56, 226 Pac. 312 (1924), a 26-year old metal worker who sustained a fractured
skull, claimed work incapacity, headaches and dizziness resulted therefrom. Evidence
was offered that the injury may cause insanity or epilepsy; verdict and judgment for
$25,000 held not excessive. For damage cases involving fracture of the skull, and revealing
tendency to make robust awards even in absence of serious associated injury, see Notes, 46
A.L.R. 1230, 1268 (1927), 102 A.L.R. 1129, 1210 (1936).
51. Kennedy, Head Injuries:Effects and Their Appraisal. IV. Evaluation of Evidence,
27 Ancii. NEUROL. & PsvcHxAT. 811, 814 (1932).
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on the basis of an inconclusive history, with but few, if any, of the foregoing
criteria satisfied, and resting mainly on conjectural and speculative inferences
based upon psychological symptoms complained of by the plaintiff, soon or
long after the alleged traumatic episode.
The criteria mentioned are not only important in evaluating probable
causal connection between head injury and results imputed to it, but in sorting
out the basis of late symptoms (i.e., determining whether they are due to
organic injury or to neurosis).
(7) Require the medical witness who has testified to injury of plaintiffs
brain, to specify whether he claims this involved concussion, contusion or
laceration of the brain and why. If indicated, cross-examine him as to the
mechanism of injury.
a. Location and extent of the brain damage. In a few areas of the brain
which are centers for particular functions 52 a substantial injury may cause
partial or permanent loss of the function. (Destroyed brain tissue does not
regenerate in functional degree.) If the damage is limited to one of the two
hemispheres of the brain, the other hemisphere may, with little or much re53
education, become able to carry out the lost function.
The remainder of an injured brain works as a whole, hence disorder
of a mental function such as memory or intellect tends to be proportional
to the area damaged. Areas of one square inch or more of the cortex (outer
portion of the brain) may be destroyed without demonstrable change in
intellect or personality.
b. Loss of consciousness: may occur without lasting injury of the brain
(as in simple concussion) or may be absent despite severe injury (as in some
cases of laceration of the brain by gunshot wound or in many cases of crushing injury to the head). Unconsciousness enduring more than 1-3 hours
usually signifies a more serious injury than simple concussion.
c. Concussion. This involves the least degree of immediate loss of consciousness with subsequent loss of memory of the moment of striking of the
head and of the few seconds or minutes (rarely hours) before the injury
("retrograde amnesia"). Concussion is not believed to involve any structural
damage to the brain: complete recovery of function occurs speedily, usually
without any sequelae. (Football players, etc.-coma and semicoma for less
than five minutes and full recovery within an hour.) May cause prolonged
coma and confusion lasting one or two weeks. Theories of causation:
(a) Temporary paralysis of brain cells in the cerebral cortex; (b) Excitation
theory-a sudden electrical discharge.
52. For instance, the center of speech in a right-handed person is located in a definite

area in the left hemisphere of the brain.

53. This is the principle upon which aphasic patients who have lost the power of speech
through war injuries, have been successfully re-educated in the interesting program conducted for the Veterans Administration Hospitals by Dr. Nielsen of California.
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d. Cerebral contusion: bruising of the brain: involves a collection of
small hemorrhages of varying sizes due to rupture of many small blood vessels.
Causes some swelling of brain at the point of injury and if the region involved
be one directly concerned with movement, sensation, vision or speech, the
disorder is apparent on medical examination of the patient. Contusion resolves
and is absorbed and the signs and symptoms due to it lessen and disappear,
usually in 3 to 6 weeks. Signs persisting longer than this indicate occurrence
of a larger hemorrhage or laceration with actual destruction of brain tissue
in the region concerned. Damage of the latter type produces a more definite
scar, and improvement continues for a longer period (3 to 6 months) sometimes leaving a stationary deficit in function. In less important areas of the
brain, this deficit in function is compensated by the remaining tissue, hence
the area of damage would have to be very large to leave a recognizable defect
in brain function (i.e., an intellectual deficit).
e. Cerebral laceration: involves actual laceration or tearing of the brain
with variable destruction of tissue. This usually results in lesser or greater
intracranial hemorrhage from cut blood vessels.
It is not unusual to see simple concussion of the brain, with little or no
demonstrable aftereffects, sold to the jury as an injury of grave import with
the result that the triers of fact are misled into returning verdicts for thousands of dollars, warrantable only in cases of permanent disability. 54 Show
that lack of customary diagnostic findings, clinical course and symptomatology, rule out cerebral contusion and/or laceration, or at least continuing
organic disability of any magnitude. 55 It may be helpful in the course of this
cross-examination, to test the witness' knowledge of the mechanisms of head
injury 56 but the examiner should take care not to educate the witness by
inept, over-informative interrogation. The burden of explanation and elucidation should be kept on the witness while probing for the limits of his
knowledge.
54. For instance, see Bowman v. Motor Transit Co., 208 Cal. 652, 284 Pac. 443 (1930)
($18,750 judgment upheld; married women sustained severe bruising and laceration of
head; concussion of brain; nervous shock, alleged impairment of mental powers etc.)
For damage cases involving concussion of the brain and revealing the liberality of
awards, see Notes, 46 A.L.R. 1230, 1266 (1927), 102 A.L.R. 1125, 1197 (1936).
55. Insist that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to-establish the precise character
of any injury and of any disability allegedly produced by it.
56. Moritz, Mechanim of Head Injury, 23 B.U.L. Rnv. 189 (1943), also in 117 ANN.
SuPG. 562 (1943). It is very important to bear. in mind the possibility of contrecoup
injury of the brain. This entails injury to the brain'at a point opposite from the application of the traumatic force to the skull. The brain, being -suspended in moveable membranes, is decelerated less rapidly than the skull and is therefore brought into violent impact with the surface of the skull opposite to that part of the cranium which strikes an
immoveable ur stationary object. Thus, if a person travelling at a high rate of speed in
an automobile is thrown against a windshield, striking the top of his cranium, severe
contrecoup injury may result to the base of the brain due to its being thrown against the
sharp bony eminences found at the base of the skull.
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(8) Determine whether plaintiff's medical witnesses claim injury to
blood vessels, and, if so, that disability resulted therefrom. If possible, rule
this out as of temporary significance.
Injuries to blood vessels within the skull may cause hemorrhage and
resultant blood clots (hematomas) which expand in size and compress the
brain, leading on to paralysis and unconsciousness. The cranium is a closed
box, hence a blood clot (or a brain tumor) tends to increase the pressure of
the cerebrospinal fluid and to compress the brain. Treatment: prompt surgical
evacuation of the blood clot by sub-temporal trephine of the skull. 7 Hematoma
occurs on both sides in 25% of the cases where it is present, hence it is
customary to make small exploratory openings ("wood-pecker surgery") in
the lower temple on each side. This is not a serious procedure and many
neurosurgeons resort to it routinely in head injury cases where any reasonable suspicion of hemorrhage exists after medical examination, lumbar
puncture and/or X-ray studies, or where the patient has developed a drowsy,
comatose condition after having been previously fully conscious.
a. Extradural hematoma: This sort of blood clot, located between the
skull and the dura mater which lines it, is due to tearing of a meningeal
artery rs (usually the middle meningeal artery which grooves the inner surface
of the skull) ordinarily by a fracture which crosses its course. It requires
several hours to develop to dangerous size, slowly compressing the brain.
("Drowsiness, stupor, increasing paralysis, especially when developing after
a lucid interval of some hours, rarely days, leads to suspicion of its presence.")59 Diagnosis is by exploratory trephine on both sides of the head.
Upon surgical evacuation of hematomas (a, b, or c), symptoms and paralysis
disappear. It is very unusual for permanent disability to occur if early surgery
is performed.
b. Chronic subdural hematoma: Chronic blood clot under the dura nater,
outermost of the three membranes investing the brain. It develops after a
longer latent interval and usually is due to tearing of veins which pass from
the brain to the large venous channels (veins) in the dura nater (the outermost of the three membranes investing the brain). It occurs more frequently
in elderly patients and in chronic alcoholics. It can occur without fracture of
the skull or without head injury severe enough to be remembered by the
patient. Develops slowly. Must be removed surgically as increasing compression of the brain leads to stupor and paralysis, and ultimately to death.
57. A small button of bone is removed from the cranium in the lower region of the
temple. This is not considered to be a major neurosurgical procedure.
58. Meningeal artery: any one of the intra-cranial arteries which supply the meninges,
or coverings, that invest the brain.
59. Denny-Brown, Factors of Importance in Head Injury, 29 VA. L. Ray. 811, 816
(1943), also in 1 CLINics 1405 (1943).
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Chronic subdural hematoma may first manifest itself weeks or months after a
head injury or, rarely, two or three years later.
c. Acute subdural henzatoma: A blood clot under the dura mater (outermost membrane investing the brain) may develop rapidly in the days immediately following a head injury being then usually due to a direct laceration
(cutting) of the surface of the brain, with entrance of mixed blood and
cerebrospinal fluid into the subdural space.
d. Subarachnoid hemorrhage: Here the hemorrhage occurs under the
arachnoid mater (middle of the three membranes which invest the brain)
and is due to laceration of the brain. It is usually mild in degree, the only
effects then being some stiffness of the neck, headache, etc., with blood passing
into the cerebrospinal fluid and being rather rapidly absorbed.
The important considerations for cross-examination are that hemorrhage
occurs promptly, following the head injury, if at all; the signs and symptoms
are readily detectible by proper examination; the treatment of watchful
waiting accompanied by supportive therapy and periodic lumbar punctures, or
of surgical intervention with evacuation of blood clots and ligature of bleeding vessels, will result in cessation of hemorrhage or the early advent of
more serious disability (paralyses, etc.) or death. In any event, the effects
of cerebral hemorrhage, if any, should be fairly determinable by the date
of trial.
(9) Go carefully into the diagnosis and treatnent of plaintiff's head
injury. This may serve to reveal deficiencies in the knowledge, experience and
evidentiary qualifications of plaintiff's physician.
Dr. H. Houston Merritt, Director of the Neurological Institute, New
York City, summarizes diagnostic aids in head injury cases as follows: 60
"1. History. Nature of accident, the general condition of the patient since the
accident including temperature, pulse, respiration, and state of consciousness.
m
'
"2. Results of general physical and neurological examination.
"3. Roentgenographic [X-ray] study of the skull.
"4. Examination of the cerebrospinal fluid. [Lumbar puncture].'
"5. Electroencephalography [i.e. brain wave tracings].'
"6. Response of the patient to treatment.
''
'
"7. Encephalography" and ventriculography."

60. Merritt, Diagnostic Considerations in Patients with Head Injury, in TRAUAIA
OF THE CENTRAL NERvous SYsTmr, 379 (1945).
61. See note 13, supra.
62. See note 33, supra.
63. See note 35, supra.
64. Encephalography:Roentgenographic examination of the head in the erect posture
following the removal of the cerebrospinal fluid and its replacement by air.
65. Ventriculography: Roentgenography of the head in several positions in a horizon-

tal posture following the removal of the cerebrospinal fluid from the ventricles of the brain
and its replacement by air: employed particularly for the diagnosis of brain tumors. In
connection with notes 64 and 65 supra, see Davidoff, X-ray Examination of the Nervous
System, 30 MiNN. L. REv. 413 (1946), a study in the National Symposium on Scientific
Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine (2d. ser.).
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The same authority classifies the treatment of head injury cases as follows:
"Group I (non-operative) [about 60% of cases]
1. Cerebral concussion
2. Cerebral contusion and laceration
"Group II (operative) [about 40% of cases or less]
1. Depressed or comminuted fractures of skull [to lift bone and restore it to
normal position]
2. Extradural hemorrhage [i.e. between skull and dura mater which lines it]
3. Subdural hemorrhage [i.e. between dura mnater and underlying arachnold
mater]
4. Intracortical clots [i.e. blood clots within brain substance]
5. Persistent leakage of cerebrospinal fluid fistula [surgery to repair and stop
leak]
6. Pneumocele [entrapped air]
7. Intracranial infections [particulary cerebral abscesses; sulfa drugs and penicillin have been effective surgical aids in preventing and combatting intracranial
infections]"'

(10) General nervous phenomena attributed by plaintiff to head injury.

The defendant should require plaintiff to particularize the nature, clinical
characteristicsand history (growing better or worse) of the nervous phenomena of which he complains. The defendant should seek to show by his
cross-examination, that the symptoms complained of are purely psychological;
that they are temporary only, and that they are principally or wholly due to
independent causes.
a. Personality changes: these range from slight emotional disturbances,
mood changes and personality changes to occasional "traumatic psychosis"
involving distortions of reality. It is now known that tremendous physical
injury of the brain is required to cause "traumatic dementia." 07 Ebaugh and
Brosin remark upon the fact that traumatic psychosis patients constitute less
than 1% of the populations of mental hospitals.08 They note the interesting
fact that in a series of 3000 autopsies done on insane patients dying in State
mental hospitals, 7.9% proved to have an unsuspected chronic subdural

hematoma (which ostensibly played a substantial role in producing their
mental afflictions)' 9 Ebaugh and Brosin find that tremendous organic injury

of the brain may fail to produce traumatic psychosis, instead being wholly
compensated for by certain patients possessed of a well-knit, balanced personality and high intelligence before the accident; whereas other patients develop
symptoms out of all relation to the demonstrable organic injury they have
sustained. 70 This and other considerations lead one to feel that the stability
66. See note 60, supra.
67. See Denny-Brown, supra note 59.
68. Ebaugh and Brosin, Traumatic Psychoses, 18 ANN. INT. MED. 666 (1943).
69. Allen, Moore, and Daly, Subdural Hemorrhage in Patients with Mental Disease:
A StatisticalStudy, 223 NElw ENGLAND J. IvED. 324 (1940).
70. Ebaugh and Brosin, supra note 68. Accord, Ruesch, Harris and Bowman, Preand Post-TraumaticPersonality in Head Injuries, in TRAUMA OF THE CENTRAL NERvous
SYs~mM 507 (1945).
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of the victim's pre-traumatic personality is of material importance and that
most traumatic psychoses are precipitated by the intense emotional upset
incident to the head trauma, rather than by the injury per se, usually in
7
persons predisposed to psychotic reaction patterns. '
Cross-examination: Determine the exact type of psychosis plaintiff has
and its probable duration. If it is of organic origin,7la trauma cannot be
incriminated as the primary cause, and even aggravation by injury may be
difficult to prove. If it is a hereditary disorder, or a functional disease (manicdepressive psychosis) in which a history of head trauma is not usually
present, the argument for causation by injury is poor. Endeavor to- show
through plaintiff's physicians, through medical history, and investigation
among social contacts that plaintiff has suffered from previous mental illness,
the purpose being to defeat causation or to reduce the claim to one of aggrava72
tion of pre-existing disease.
Actually, psychosis due to head injury generally has its own symptomatology ii which traumatic delirium, appearing shortly after the injury, is one
important finding.73 Where a long asymptomatic (symptom free) interval
appears between injury and psychosis, the causal connection is increasingly
speculative and suspect. To establish a prima facie case of causal connection,
it seems reasonable to require "bridging symptoms," except possibly in rare
cases due to chronic subdural hematome (expanding blood clots, exerting
increasing pressure on the brain, discussed previously).
b. Traumatic epilepsy (often called Jacksonian epilepsy in honor of the
English physician, Dr. Hughlings Jackson, who contributed so much to the
medical literature of the subject) : It is believed to be due to formation of
scar tissue following laceration of meninges and brain. As scar tissue grows
older it contracts so that traction may be exerted on the brain with resultant
creation of a focus of irritation. In true traumatic epilepsy, the place where
the convulsive seizure originates (arm, leg, etc.) corresponds to the location
of the "focus of irritation" in the brain. Later, traumatic epilepsy may become
generalized and difficult to distinguish from hereditary or idiopathic epilepsy,
especially if epilepsy begins months -or years later rather than weeks after
the head injury.74 Rare cases have been repoxted of alleged traumatic epilepsy
occurring as late as 20 years after head injury, but actually those who will
71. Ibid.
71a. As, for instance: general paresis: caused by neurosyphilis, a disease produced by
a spirochaete, the treponelna pallidum; Pick's or Allheiner's diseases: due to atrophy
of the brain tissue; senile dementia: due to aging or dysfunction of brain cells; cerebral
arteriosclerosis:this produces narrowing of arteries which in turn causes an impoverishment of the blood supply to the brain tissue; Korsakov's psychosis, delirium tremens or
other condition due to alcoholism.
72. See references in notes 68-70 supra.
73. See Ebaugh and Brosin, supra note 68.
74. Denny-Brown, supra note 59.
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develop such epilepsy generally do so early: more than 50% of all traumatic
epilepsies become manifest within one year following the impact.7
Cross-examination: Prove, if possible, that plaintiff does not have epilepsy
at all, but "black-outs" from independent, nontraumatic causes; or that
plaintiff's epilepsy pre-existed the accident; or that his seizures are not
characteristic of the traumatic variety; or that more than a year has transpired
since the accident, cutting in half the statistical risks of future epilepsy, so
that its occurrence is only a possible consequence, not a probable complication,
reasonably certain to occur, for which the law allows compensation.
The risk of epilepsy following head injury is of the following order:
after concussion-0.02%; after linear fracture of the cranial vault-0.5 to
1.0%; after severe head injury with laceration of the brain but without
fracture of the skull or laceration of the dura mater-i0 to 20%; after severe
head injury with depressed fracture of the skull, fragments of which have
lacerated the dura mater and brain-20 to 45 o. It follows that in no case
can the plantiff prove traumatic epilepsy is a probable result of head injury
76
except where it has materialized by the time of trial.
It seems that an hereditary tendency to epilepsy may be converted into
77
frank epilepsy by emotional shock.
Some cases of traumatic epilepsy may be relieved by surgical removal
of the old scar 78 in a manner which lessens traction on the brain and
eliminates the focus of irritation. Other cases may be controllable by sodium
dilantin or other drugs 7o though it should be noted that these agents merely
minimize or prevent seizures without producing a cure.
Brain disturbance and the risk of future epilepsy may be more accurately
appraised by making serial electroencephalograms (brain wave tracings) at
Tegular time intervals following the occurrence of head injuries. 0 Show that
plaintiff's physicians have not made such studies.
75. Gibbs, supra note 35.

76. S. BROCK,
IMPORTANT

INJURIES OF THE CENTRAL NEsvoUs SYSTEM: EVALUATION OF THE
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AND

GENERAL

SURVEY

OF

TRAUmATIC

CEREBRAL

AND

SPINAL SYNDROMES (unpublished manuscript). There is considerable variation in the
figures of various authorities as to the incidence of post-traumatic epilepsy. The above
figures would be considered high in some quarters. See, for instance, Penfield and
Shaver, The Incidence of Traumatic Epilepsy and Headache after Head Injury ill Civil
Practice, in TRAUMA OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYsTEM 620 (1945). The authors reported an incidence of traumatic epilepsy in 407 cases of only 2.7%. The authors feel that
seizures occurring during hospitalization do not prove .traumatic epilepsy, the proper
determinant being whether the seizures occur after discharge from hospital. They say:
"It would seem to us that the 'early fit' should be considered as a symptom only. It
usually means subpial hemorrhage or at all events, some acute irritation of the cerebral
cortex. Only later development of recurring attacks should be accepted as traumatic
epilepsy, and this condition is apt to persist unless eventually it is treated by discriminating
radical surgical intervention." Id. at 632.
77. Denny-Brown, supranote 59.
78. See Penfield, supra note 76.
79. See Symposium on Psychomotor epilepsy, in J. OF CLIN. NEUROL. (1950) (in
press).
80. See Gibbs, supra note 63.
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c. "Post-concussion syndrome," "Traumatic neurasthenia," "Posttraumatic general cerebralsyndrome," "Post-traumaticpsychoneurotic state":
These are some of the names given to a group of persisting symptoms which
sometimes follow head injury such as: generalized headache, dizziness (usually
in rising from sitting or stooping position, or on turning or looking up), and
difficulty in concentration with, or without, nervous depression and insomnia
(sleeplessness). The chief problems revolve around the degree to which the
symptoms are of organic or of psychological origin, and their likely
permanency.
The foregoing symptoms may be: (a) Due to severe concussion of the
brain only. (b) The result of severe injuries (Ritchie Russell,8 ' DennyBrown 82), "but they are then usually delayed in onset and often are overshadowed by other troubles." 83 (c) Chiefly or entirely psychological in
origin-i.e., a traumatic psychoneurosis.
Cross-Examination: Seek to show that the stimulus or trauma was
trivial, that no physical (organic) injury to the brain has been demonstrable,
and that psychiatric study and occupational and social history reveal longstanding neurotic conflicts or at least a pretraumatic psychoneurotic personality pattern. It is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to determine the
organic-psychologic fractions involved in these symptoms and their just relation to the head injury. Attempts have been made to develop psychological
tests to distinguish "diffuse organic cases" from "neurotic," as, for instance,
the Columbia Head Injury Psychological Test Battery.84 The symptoms
usually clear up in months or at most in a few years. Fifty per cent of
neurotic cases clear up after lump sum settlements. It seems clear that the
condition should not be compensated as a permanent disability.
(11) Intellectual deterioration due to head injury (criteria for appraising).
We have seen that intellectual deterioration due to head injury rarely
attains the degree of a psychosis, and then principally in chronic alcoholics
or persons having previous impairment. But substantial head injuries may
produce residual deficits of intelligence in mild degree. Dr. Denny-Brown,
Professor of Neurology at Harvard Medical School and Chief of the Neurological Service, Boston City Hospital, tells us:
"Much more frequent among persistent mental disorders is a more subtle change in
personality, noticeable to those who knew the patient well before and after the injury.
81. Russell, The After-effects of Head Injury, 41 EINBuRGH M.J. (pt. 2) 129 (1934).
82. Denny-Brown, supra note 59.
83. Id. at 826.
84. Lynn, Levine and Hewson, Psychologic Tests for the Clinical Evaluation of Late
'Diffuse Organic,' 'Neurotic,' and 'Normal' Reactions after Closed Head Injury, in
TRAiMA OF THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEm 296 (1945). See, also, cc. 18-21 the same
work, dealing with various aspects of the late symptoms of head injury.
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This change is characterized by mood disorder, with superadded nervous manifestations.
In a certain proportion of cases there is a deeper change in character and undeniable
defect in mental capacity."'
"If such intellectual change is to be accounted for by a localized destruction of
brain tissue there should have been a severe local injury, initial disturbance compatible
with moderate to severe brain swelling, a maximal intellectual damage on first recovery
of consciousness, then steady improvement up to a final stationary level. [There is]
usually both external evidence (severe-localized comminution of the skull) and neurologic evidence (aphasia [i.e. speech difficulty], paralysis) as well as deep and prolonged
initial intellectual disorder. [While intellectual defect may also result from severe
generalized injury] there should have been coma for a day or more and confusion
Thus a patient who suffers no more than momentary loss of
for a week or more ....
consciousness, [and whose initial mental disturbance lasted] less than one day, .. could
not suffer from significant residual intellectual defect."'
Cross-Examination: Capitalize the failure of plaintiff's proof to meet the
criteria mentioned above. Observe that the maximum intellectual defect can
be established very soon after the head injury and improvement of the patient
can be followed by successive intelligence tests until the final defect, if any,
is established. Post-traumatic school, work and other performance records
may show that the plaintiff is up to his pre-traumatic levels. Insist that
plaintiff's claims of intellectual impairment are not adequately substantiated
because psychological, neurological and psychiatric examinations of complementary character have not been made immediately after the traumatic
episode and at customary intervals thereafter.
The rarity of intellectual impairment as a result of. head injury is corroborated by Dr. Edwin M\. Cole of Boston, reporting upon the duration of
intellectual impairment in 119 head injury cases. Cases of chronic alcoholism,
chronic unemployment, etc., were excluded. Frequent observations and psychological examinations (verbal and performance tests) were carried out
during hospitalization and convalescence and up to 6 months after discharge
from the hospital. Dr. Cole found that:
"[D]uring 24 hours after injury 64 per cent of the cases corresponded to what
was estimated to have been their pre-traumatic intelligence. During the remainder of
the hospital stay 74 per cent had reached their original level of intelligence. When
examined about one month after discharge from hospital, 90 per cent seemed to have
returned to their original intelligence level. And finally, when the last measure of
intelligence was made, at about six months after discharge only four cases, 3.3 per cent,
had intelligence of lower order than their estimated pre-traumatic intelligence. Close
scrutiny of the psychiatric history of these four patients revealed in each some cause
for uncertainty of attainment or maintenance of the calculated pre-traumatic level.
We are therefore not certain of a single clear example of continued intellectual impair[H]eadaches were absent, or of less than
ment -in this selected group of patients ....
six months duration, in many more of those cases having a normal or above normal
At two months after
intelligence, than in patients with below normal intelligence ....
85. Denny-Brown, Intellectual DeteriorationResulting from Head Ijurn,,in TRAUMA
467 (1945).
86. Denny-Brown, Factors of Importance in Head Injuries, 29 VA. L. REv. 811,
821, 822 (1943), also in 1 CLiNics 1405 (1943). •
OF THE CENTRAL Nmvous SYSTEm
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injury, we find 90 per cent of those having above normal intelligence back at work but
only 65 per cent of the normal intelligence group back at work and only 45 per cent of
the below normal intelligence group at work after injury.'

(12) Plaintiff often dramatizes the presence of such signs and symptoms
appearing in him immediately after the injury as unconsciousness, paralysis,
deliritun, inability to speak or to recognize friends, and the like. Defendant
must be alert to show that this immediate symptomatology imay be due solely
to temporary surgical shock without involving any permannet injury of the
nervous system. He nust bring home the fact that a reasonable time must
pass. before physicians can establish the nature and degree of injury present
and the residualdisability, if any, which plaintiff will have after convalescence,
8
treatment and rehabilitation."
(13) The passage of time quickly determines, and usually long before
trial, whether or not a head injury will cause death or likely complications.
If they have not materialized by that time, compel plaintiff's ph.ysicians N
admit that the risk of occurrence of each possible complication is now so far
below 50o that it is not "reasonably certain to occur in future." Such a risk
is a mere "possibility," too conjectural and speculative to - be admitted to
compensation under the present law of damages.8 9
Passage of time serves as a sieve for sorting out items of damage in bead
injury cases.
a. Death. Dr. Rowbotham found in 1,000 consecutive cases of acute head
injury brought to hospital, that 163 or 16.3'% died: 49 or 4.97o within 12
hours; 54 or 5.4% within the next 12 hours; 2.17 on the 2nd day; 1.3% on
the 3rd day; .77 on the 4th day; .3% on the 5th day; .1% on the 6th day;
.2% on the 7th day; .6% in the 2nd week; .4% in the 3rd week; and-.3%
thereafter (total-16.3%) 9°
In 1,000 acute head injury cases reported by Drs. Wortis and Kennedy
from Bellevue Hospital, New York, where all the patients had a fracture of
tle skull, the death rate was 25.8% in children under 12 years of age and
49.6% in people over 60 years of age. Virtually all the deaths occurred within
10 days, most within 5 days but a few as late as 45 days after the injury.91
87. Cole, Intellectual Impairment in Head Ijury, in TRAUMA OF THE CENTRAL

NERvous SYSTEm 473, 477, 478 (1945).
88. We have seen, supra,in note 76, that one may even have convulsive seizures during
this early period which are temporary phenomena not indicative- of traumatic epilepsy.
89. In tort actions, "the recovery, if any, must be for all the injuries and all the
damages resulting therefrom, whether past, present, or prospective, once and for all.
In cases coming within this rule, a recovery may be had for prospective damages which
are reasonably certain to accrue." 15 Am. JuR., Damages § 24 (1938). "Damages for
future pain and suffering must have a basis in the evidence submitted to support the claim
therefor; pain and suffering which are merely possible and speculative or conjectural are

not to be considered in assessing the damages." Id. § 73.
90. ROWBOTHAM, AcuTE INJURIES OF THE HEAD (1942).
91. Wortis, Herman and London, . Mental Changes in Patients with Subdural
Heinatomas, in TRAUMA OF THE CEmTAL NERvous SySTEM 274 (1945). - . -
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Thus, risk of death from head injury becomes negligible after a patient
92
has survived for a few weeks.
Let us consider now the incidence of the other chief complications of
head injury.
b. Henorrhageinto extradural space (extra-dural hematoma), 1.3%.
c. Hemorrhageinto subduralspace (acute sub-dural hematoma), 1.0% .°a
(Chronic subdural hematoma based on 100 head injury cases, Bellevue Hospital, New York City), 0.4%. In the Bellevue series, consisting of 50 cases
of subdural hematoma proven by operation, some degree of post-traumatic
mental change (chiefly disturbances of abstract thinking, with a relatively
good preservation of concrete thinking) was noted in 15 patients (30o)
and 6 (12%) had mood disturbances sufficiently serious to impair their
behavior severely. Chronic subdural hematomas may not become manifest
until weeks or months have passed or rarely until 2 or 3 years after the
head injury.9"
d. Infection: will usually appear promptly or within a few weeks if at
all: it may involve the scalp, the bone of the skull (osteomyelitis), the membranes surrounding the brain (meningitis). Dr. Vance made post-mortem
studies in 500 fatal head injury cases and found that only 1.4% of patients
died of "septic infections including septicemia, extradural and subdural
abscess." 95 Since the date of this series great advances have been made in
chemotherapy (sulfadrugs, penicillin, aureomycin, etc.) so that infections are
more frequently prevented or minimized than in former days, by the prompt
administration of drugs.
Very infrequently an intracranial abscess 90 may appear weeks or months,
or rarely years after a missile or object has been carried into the brain
by a gunshot wound or other injury. This risk, too, seems to have been substantially reduced by newer forms of treatment.
Defendant's counsel should bear in mind that ordinarily the presence
or absence of existing infection is readily determinable by medical exami97
nation.
e. Traumatic Epilepsy: discussed previously. Observe that the initial
risk that this complication will develop in future is always less than 50%,
however severe the head injury, and that the particular risk is cut in half if
epilepsy has not developed within 12 months after the trauma.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.

95. Vance, Fractures of the Skull, 14 ARcH. SURG. 1023 (1927).
96. King, Infections Complicating Head Injuries, in TRAUMA OF THE CENTRAL
NE~vous SYsm 578 (1945); Grant, Post-Traumatic Brain Abscess. Post-Traumatic
Meningitis, in BROCK (ed.) INJURIES OF THE BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD AND THIMR
COVERINGS 174 (3d ed. 1949). Dr. Brock's book is one of the most valuable scientific

source books on various aspects of head injuries.
97. Ibid.
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Insurance company statistics based on 47,130 cases revealed one case of
epilepsy appearing per 1,000 head injuries of all types.98 Obviously, however,
scientific appraisal of a particular case calls for determining the fact and
degree of injury to skull, meninges, and underlying brain in each case, using
such auxiliary methods of study as interim electrocenphalograms in determining prognosis.
f. Post-traumatic states (headaches, dizziness, impaired concentration,
increased fatigability, lowered tolerance to alcohol, unstable work history,
decrease of interest, impaired libido, etc.) may occur, as we have seen, due
to focal or diffuse physical injury of the brain, or to psychoneurosis or due
to both.
On the average of about six weeks after a more or less severe blow on
the head and immediately following hospital convalescence from the acute
traumatic effects, about 80% of all such patients are recovered, while 20%
continue to complain of headache and/or other symptoms which restrict or
prohibit their return to their usual social and work responsibilities. These
persistent late complaints in severe but uncomplicated cases are usually
clearly separable from any residual acute effects by the end of three or four
months following the injury. 9
Defendant's counsel can see that inasmuch as head injury cases will not
be tried until 6 to 24 months after the traumatic episode, sufficient time will
have passed to rule in or out the development of this complication and to
study its origin and effects.
It has been found medically that speedy compromise settlement (preferably not later than 6 months after the injury) is of great value in curing or
arresting symptoms due to neurosis.
g. Intellectual deterioration due to head injury. Dr. Cole 100 found, in
studying 119 head injury cases, as we have seen, that only 36% of patients
had any apparent impairment of pre-traumatic intelligence 24 hours after the
traumatic episode, this dropping to 3.3% by six months after discharge of
the patients from treatment, and there being reason to think that the persistence of symptoms in this small group may have been determined by preexisting personality deficits in the individuals concerned. At any rate, *the
presence or absence of intellectual deterioration due to head injury should
be medically and psychologically ascertainable by the date of trial.
We have sought to show that if a careful inventory is made of all possible sequelae of a head injury, these will materialize, will become rateable
98. FEINBERG, EPILEPSIE UND TRAUMA (1934), cited in Symonds, TraumaticEpilepsy,
2 LANCET 1217 (1935).
99. See Denny-Brown, supra note 59; Denny-Brown, Intellectual Deterioratio);
Resulting from Head Injury, in TRAUMA OF THE CENTRAL NERVous Sy'sTEm 467 (1945);
Cole, Intellectual Impairment i Head Injury, in id. 473.
100. Cole, supra note 99.
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risks, or be eliminated altogether rather speedily during the days intervening
between the traumatic episode and the time of compromise negotiations or trial.
Furthermore, the complications which still might occur in future, though they
have not yet appeared, dwindle in magnitude so sharply by the end of
3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months as to fall far below the requirements of compensability (i.e., reasonable certainty that they will occur in future).
(14) Cross-examinationdirected to malingering in head injury cases.
Malingering is an important topic but it seems preferable to consider it
in relation to all neuropsychiatric disabilities, at a later point in this study. 10'
STRATEGIC

CONSIDERATIONS IN

CRoss-EXAMINATION

OF ALLEGED

NEUROPSYCHIATRIc DISABILITY: INJURY TO PERIPHERAL NERVES;

INJURY TO THE SPINAL CORD; AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING
ORGANIC DISEASE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

1. Alleged Injury to Peripheral Nerves
Peripheral nerves are the conduits or cables over which nervous impulses
pass between bodily organs, muscles and tissues and the spinal cord and
brain. Sensory nerves carry sensations (such as hot, cold, pain, pressure, etc.),
picked up by receptors in skin and other organs, to the spinal cord and brain
for appreciation, interpretation and initiation of appropriate motor responses.
Motor impulses flow outward from brain and spinal cord over motor nerves
to motor end plates in muscles and organs causing the latter to contract or
relax and so to carry out a particular physiologic function. Some peripheral
nerves contain both sensory and motor fibers. What disability will ensue
when a nerve is severed depends upon what kind of fibers are cut and upon
what organs and functions were dependent upon the particular nerve supply.
The distribution and functions of particular peripheral nerves are now
so well known that a qualified examiner can readily determine from the
functions lost, and the modalities impaired, what nerve or nerves have been
affected by the injury. By a parity of reasoning, appropriate neurological
examination can localize organic injury to particular spinal tracts or specialized areas of the brain.
" Defendant's counsel should not be satisfied with a vague inventory
of
peripheral nerve lesions. He is entitled to have the plaintiff specify what
nerves and functions have been affected by an alleged injury. The court
should regard a plaintiff's claim of ignorance of these details as an admission
of lack of competent neurological examination and the need for further study
by a specialist. It is customary to map out the exact distribution of anesthesia
(loss of sensation) in the skin areas and to record definitely the loss of limitation of movement and the muscles whose nerve supply has been affected.
101. See infra.
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Severed peripheral nerves regenerate in most instances,' 0 2 without or
with surgical suture, but since World War II the majority of 'surgeons consider exploratory surgery a part of sound diagnosis, and believe that best
end results are attained by suturing the cut nerve ends.
Thus, Dr. Bristow declares: 103 "Itwill be obvious that the earlier the
suture is done, the less will be the wasting and general change in the limb, no
matter how well looked after, and emphasis should be laid on the need for
keeping up the nutrition and the joint movement during any period of
waiting, however short this period may be."
And Drs. Davis and Perrett say:
of complete nerve interruption and with the'presence of a
"With a syndrome ...
wound in the anatomic course of the nerve, exploration should be regarded as a part
of diagnosis. Ifthe nerve is found intact, no harm is done. It is not wise to explore
only if signs of returning function fail to appear [6 to 9 months after the injury] because
a nerve repair performed at that time usually will not be successful. As a general
principle, it has been almost universally accepted that the earlier an injured nerve is
repaired, the better are the chances for effective regeneration and improving functional
results ...especially when the injury to tbe nerve was a clean severance" but some delay
is indicated in cases of closed injury.'
Various investigators "all found that a slight delay was better because of the impossibility of knowing the extent of injury within the proximal segment" of a severed
nerve which is a traumatic intraneural damage' and oftentimes quite severe and
extensive, and should be resected before suture' is performed. This traumatic zone will
undergo fibrosis within a few weeks and then the amount of nerve to be resected can
easily be determined."'0

MNost recent writers have adopted the new nomenclature recently suggested by Seddon and Cohen for the classification of peripheral nerve injuries,
this being as follows: neurotmesis (complete anatomic interruption), axonotinesis (partial interruption, nerve contusion), and neurapraxia (nerve concussion, physiologic nerve lesion). Davis and Perrett say, in commenting on
this useful analysis: "It still remains clinically impossible to differentiate
102. Regeneration occurs in peripheral nerve fibers but not in those of the central
nervous system, the presence of a neurilemma (a membranous outer covering, or sheath
surrounding the nerve fiber) being necessary for the process. "It has been shown that
a fibrosis takes place after a long period of muscle atrophy which keeps the regenerated
nerve fibers from making proper connection with old motor end plates." Davis and Perret,
Peripheral Nerve Injuries, in 3 PRoGRss ix NEUROLOGY AND PsYcHIATRY 303,305
(Spiegel ed. 1948).
103. Bristow, Injuries of PeripheralNerves in Two World Wars, 34 BRIT. J.SURG.
333, 338 (1947).
104. Syndrome: a complex of symptoms; a set of symptoms which occur together;
the sum of signs of any morbid state. The word is commonly used in medicine to connote
the characteristic set of symptoms found in clinical conditions about which we do not as
yet know the full etiology, physiology and pathology.
105. Davis and Perret, supra note 102, at 308.
106. Proximal segment: the portion nearest the head end of the body. The distal
segment would be the portion nearest the foot end of the body.
107. Intranenral damage: damage to the inside of the nerve.
108. Suture: sewing together.
109. Davis and Perret, supra note 102, at 309.
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between neurotmesis and axonotmesis; in both there is complete paralysis
with reaction 'of degeneration and lost nerve conduction below the lesion." 110
Defendant's counsel should be aware of the value of electrodiagnosis,
especially in the study of degeneration and regeneration, whether a nerve is
repaired or not." He should familiarize himself, too, with details of postoperative treatment and rehabilitation. While muscles are paralyzed, physical
therapy, massage and passive movement must be used to protect later recovery
of function, to minimize atrophy, to prevent contractures and ankylosis
(stiffening of joints). Later: "Occupational therapy and rehabilitation may
help the treatment of residuals of paralysis and substitute the use of other
muscles for the performance of certain motions which were previously done
by hopelessly paralyzed or fibrotic muscles." 112
Defendant's counsel may be able to show through cross-examination that
plaintiff's paralysis was psychological (hysterical) rather than organic; that
his complaints do not correspond with the known distribution of any particular nerve (malingering or neurosis) ; that regeneration of the nerve and
restoration of function have left but little or, no residual disability and that
this may be alleviated or overcome by reasonable rehabilitative measures not
yet applied."
2. Alleged Injury to the Spinal Cord;Aggravation of Pre-existing
Organic Disease of the Nervous System
At our invitation, Dr. Foster Kennedy 114 and Dr. Peter G. Denker,115
eminent neurologists 116 of New York City, recently prepared an invaluable
study on "Medico-legal Aspects of Spinal Cord Injuries" 117 from which
counsel may gather the detailed information, and the criteria needed to carry
out the systematic sort of cross-examination previously suggested.
It should be realized that the spinal cord is a solid cable of nervous tissue
about eighteen inches long, divided into ascending (sensory) tracts and
descending (motor) tracts, its principal functions being to transmit sensory
impulses inwards to the brain, and motor commands from the brain to body
organs. It also serves as a clearing house"18 for reflex impulses involved in such
functions as urination, defecation and the sexual act.
110. Id. at 306.
111. Id. at 306-07.
112. Id. at 325.
113. See KESSLER,

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

OF

REHABILITATION

(1950).

114. Professor, Clinical Neurology, Cornell University Medical College; Director,
Neurological Service, Bellevue Hospital, New York City.
115. Asst. Professor, Clinical Neurology, Cornell University Medical College;
Associate Attending Neurologist, Bellevue Hospital, New York City.
116. Neurologist: a medical man who specializes in the diagnosis and treatment
of disorders of the nervous system.
117. 11 Mo.L.REv. 111 (1946).
118. Ie., inreflex activities sensory impulses coming into the spinal cord may there
set up an automatic motor response traveling back from the cord to muscles or glands,
without necessity for intervention of the brain.
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Cross-examination must be based upon a knowledge of the required
neurological examination 10 and the significance of various findings, and of
the types of spinal cord injury, such as may be derived from the monograph
of Kennedy and Denker. 120 Among the valuable observations made by the
last named authors are these: "In our experience, practically every important
spinal cord injury is accompanied with immediate evidence of injury of a
motor, sensory, or reflex character.... We agree with Kinnier Wilson who
wrote, 'In genuine trauma of the central nervous system (and this applies
especially to the spinal cord) symptoms arise practically at once'." 121
If the spinal cord has been severed, or important tracts cut, permanent
loss of various functions dependent upon the passage of impulses through
the cord below that point may be expected, for destroyed spinal cord tissue,
22
similarly to destroyed brain tissue, lacks effective powers of regeneration.
Prove, if possible, that such functions have not been lost at all, or, if so, only
temporarily. If medical access can be had to the plaintiff, an expert neurologist can confirm the presence or absence of his disability and its degree.
The subject of ruptured intervertebral disc has become important, medicolegally, since the syndrome was first described by Mixter and Barr in the
23
20's and a monograph is now available on this subject.
The nervous system is subject to various chronic, degenerative diseases
and there is a dangerous possibility that a plaintiff may erroneously impute
the natural symptoms of such a condition to an accident caused by the
defendant. We may tabulate these conditions and opinions as to the etiological
role of injury in their causation as follows:
Trauma a
Condition
Cause
Known Cause?
No
Unknown ...............
Multiple sclerosis 124 ................
General paresis 125 . ...................
Syphilis ..................
No
Parkinson's disease

126 ..............

Muscular atrophies

127 .............

Syringomyelia

...

No

See footnote ..............

No

See footnote .....

128...................

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis

See footnote .............

129

.....

Progressive muscular atrophy'130 ....
Acute anterior poliomyelitis 131 ......

........

No

See footnote ..............

No

See footnote ..............

No

Virus ..................
No
Tabes dorsalis (locomotor ataxia) 13 2 .. Syphilis of the spinal cord... No
Spinal cord tumors -13................. Unknown ...............

No

119. See note 13, supra.
120. See note 117, supra.
121. Id. at 115, 120. Kinnier Wilson is author of the well known treatise
on Neurology; see supra note 13.
122. See Scarff, Injuries of the Vertebral Colum and Spinal Cord in BROCIC (ed.),
INjuRIEs oF THE BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD AND THEIR CoVrINGS 510 (3d ed. 1949).
123. Barr and Craig, Medicolegal Aspects of Ruptured Intervertebral Disks, 1946
INs. L. J. 261 (1946), also in 103 J. NEin. & MENT. Dis. 688 (1946), a study in the
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It appears that some of these diseases may be aggravated by traumatic
injury of proper location and severity 134 in which case a quick and clear
progression of the characteristic symptomatology should appear, rather than
mere worsening of plaintiff's condition due to independent traumatic disabilities added to a stationary impairment resulting from the pre-existing
disease.
Second National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine.
124. A chronic disease of the nervous system, involving usually both brain and spinal
cord; in early stages, the spinal cord alone may be affected. It occurs in early adult life,
usually in persons between 20 and 40. It is progressive in its course, but with frequent
remissions, and eventually, 10 or 20 years after its onset, it usually causes most patients
to become incapacitated and bed-ridden.
125. Also known as dementia paralytica,a chronic disease of the brain of a degenerative sort marked by progressive loss of mental and physical power, due to syphilitic
infection and involvement of the central nervous system.
126. Shaking palsy (paralysis), or Parkinson's Disease: a disease usually of late
life, progressive in its course, and marked by a characteristic tremor of the muscles,
weakness, delay or voluntary motion, a peculiar hurried gait and a muscular contraction,
causing peculiar and characteristic positions of the limbs and head.
127. There are several degenerative diseases of muscle which are not caused by injury
and which have no medicolegal aspects. Among these are Myasthenia gravis, Family
periodic paralysis, Muscular paralysis associated with renal failure, Muscular dystrophies,
Thomsen's disease (Myotonia congenita) and Myotonia Atrophica.
128. The existence of abnormal cavities, filled with liquid, in the substance of the
spinal cord. These cavities are surrounded by an abnormal tissue resembling that which
is found normally surrounding the central canal. The disease is due to hemorrhage and
consequent softening and necrosis (death of tissue), and is believed to be dependent
on defects of development. It occurs in adults between the ages of 20 and 30 years,
and is marked by muscular atrophy, loss of the sense of temperature, and pressure, and
by various vasomotor (circulatory) and trophic (nutritional) disturbances.
129. These are probably types of a similar disease process. In both conditions, the
anterior horn cells of the spinal cord are affected; the difference between them is that
in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, the pyramidal tracts are clinically also involved. They
are diseases, therefore, limited to the motor system, of a degenerative type, and progressive
in their course. Their cause is unknown.
130. See supra note 129.
131. The patient will be so quickly incapacitated by the disease, as a rule, that
there is little prospect of his receiving a traumatic injury after its onset.
132. A chronic disease of the nervous system characterized by degeneration of
the posterior columns of the spinal cord and the centers for pupillary light reactions and
of the sensory nerve tracts. It is a disease of middle life, especially frequent in males
and is due to syphilitic infection of the nervous system. Its course is slow, usually progressive, and may be associated with general paresis, commonly known as "softening of the
brain"; in such cases the condition is generally spoken of as taboparesis.
133. There is no evidence that injury is a primary cause of such tumors. See Warren,
CriteriaRequired to Prove Causation of Occupational or Traumatic Tionors, 10 U. or
CHL L. Rav. 313 (1943), also in 117 ANN. SURG. 585 (1943), a study in the National
Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine.
134. Kennedy and Denker, supra note 117, say positively that syringomyelia may
be aggravated by adequate traumatic injury. On the question of aggravation of general
paresis and tabes dorsalis by trauma, see Merritt and Solomon, Relation of Trauma to
Syphilis and the Nervous System, 23 B.U.L. REv. 261 (1943), also in 117 ANN. SXMG.
623 (1943), a study in the National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law
and Medicine. As to aggravation of multiple sclerosis by injury, see Keschner, The

Effect of Injuriesand Illness on the Course of Multiple Sclerosis, in MULTIPLE ScLEaoss
AND THE DEMYELATING DisEAs s 533 (Vol. 28, Res. Publ. Ass'n for Res. in Nerv. and

Ment. Dis. 1950). See, also, Wechsler, The Relationship of Brain Injury to Other Organic
Diseases of the Brain, in BROCK (ed.), INJURIES OF THE BRAIN AND SPINAL CoRn
AND THEm CoV

INGs

420 (3d ed. 1949) ; and Davis, The Relationship of Spinal Cord

Injuries to Other Diseases of the Spinal Cord, in id. at 654.
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STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED

NEUROPSYCHiATRIC DISABILITY: TRAUMATic NEUROSIS

The problem of traumatic neurosis involves primarily psychiatric evaluation as the neurologist can find no organic lesion of the nervous system to
account for the symptoms produced by the condition.
It may be useful here to recall that modern psychiatry is concerned with
four main sorts of conditions, among others, namely:
a. Psychoses (organic or functional) : involving more severe mental and
nervous symptoms characterized by distortion of reality in one or more spheres.
b. Neuroses: emotional conflicts, which may organize around underlying
injury to the nervous system but-n general have no organic basis and involve
no distortion of reality.
c. Psychopathic personality: a somewhat suspect diagnosis currently
applied to behavior disorders involving supposed characterological and developmental faults resulting in marked weakness of super-ego (conscience) and
volitional controls, and frequently characterized by repeated anti-social acts.
No signs or symptoms of temporary acute illness can be found and the difficulty seems to run to deep rooted distortions in formation of the personality
very difficult to correct or reverse by any known form of treatment.13 5
d. Psychosomatic complaints: Every situation, every accidental injury
or disease which affects the human organism, operates to produce both
somatic (physical) and psychic (emotional) reactions and recognition of this
fact has opened up large new vistas of Psychosomatic Medicine in which the
various branches of medicine are finding inter-linking relations with the
mental sciences,
The psychopathic personality conceivably may be due, at least in part,
to continued psychic traumatization of the sensitive, developing child but it
is not ascribable to such isolated traumatic episodes as might lead to tort
liabilities of strangers. We have seen that traumaticpsychosis, while theoretically possible, is exceedingly rare. We propose to deal hereafter with disabilities allegedly due to psychic stimuli (Forensic Psychosomatic Medicine).136 We desire to focus now on traumatic neuroses, psychiatric conditions
which involve much-litigated, vexatious questions of law and fact.
(1) The cross-examiner must ground himself in the clinical characteristics of the neuroses in preparinghimself to test the testimony of plaintiff's
physicians.
135. HENmERSON, PSYCHOPATHIC STATES (1939) ; Coon, Psychiatry for the Lawyer:
Common PsychiatricStates Not Due to Psychoses, 31 CORN. L.Q. (1946).

136. Alleged injury by fright, etc.
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The writer desires leave to produce as background material, excerpts
from a monograph published in collaboration with Dr. Harry C. Solomon,
37
Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School.
"In a consideration of disease entities, one hopes to have a knowledge of etiology,"
pathology,"s ' or pathological physiology,"'0 a clear description of the symptoms, and course
of the disorder. These factors in complete form are not available in regard to those
disorders which we designate as 'psychoneuroses.'
"In a discussion of medical problems, as of all scientific matters, a clear definition
of terms is usually a prerequisite. Unfortunately, it is not possible to define precisely
the term 'psychoneurosis.' In fact, most text-books baldly state that one can describe
the symptoms of the psychoneuroses, divide them into symptomatic categories, but that
one cannot either limit the territory of the disorders or tell where the psychoneurosis
is to be separated from the normal. Such statements refer, naturally, to the borderline
case, not to the full blown conditions of which we shall speak. Nor is it difficult for the
experienced psychiatric examiner to spot the usual pre-neurotic constitution, if proper
heed be paid to the individual's history and behavior patterns rather than solely to a
search for an organic disease or lesion. It is fundamental to our concept that no
structural pathology of the nervous or visceral systems has been discovered or indeed
exists to explain the psychoneuroses. This viewpoint has certain consequences. It
places the psychoneuroses in a different compartment from most diseases; it does not
allow for a check of diagnosis through studies of pathology. A second fundamental
concept is that the disorder or disorders are chiefly manifest in the mental life of the
sufferer and therefore are largely subjective, although many of the symptoms have
organic or objective components. This second principle has led to the conception of
the etiology of the psychoneuroses as being in the field of the psyche, and one usually
considers the cause as psychogenic.
"Summing up the foregoing, it may be said that the psychoneuroses represent a
group of symptom complexes or syndromes4 having no structural pathology, arising
psychogenetically or out of the stresses and experiences of life, and manifested largely
by subjective feelings and thoughts with some secondary physiological deviations.
One must also assume that some individuals are more able and some less able to
withstand the stresses and vicissitudes of life. And so the concept of individual vulner-

ability is introduced, with the further implication of the stability of the constitutional
equipment. This brings in another term difficult to define and measure, but a factor

which must be estimated and assigned a value, as we shall see later. One may well
believe that no one can withstand certain severe stresses, and therefore vulnerability
is a matter of degree of resistance. This means we must take the resistance of the
average person, roughly estimated, as our norm in determining whether the supposedly
causal stimulus would have been adequate to produce neurosis in an ordinary individual.
137. Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses i,Court 30 VA. L. REV. 87, 88-96
(1943), also in 21 A-Nx. INT. MED. 367, 368 (1944).
138. Etiology: the study or theory of the causation of any disease; the sum total of
knowledge regarding causes.
139. Pathology: that branch of medicine which treats of the essential nature of
disease, especially of the structural and functional changes caused by disease. The
majority of diseases produce characteristic changes in cells and tissues of the organs
affected. A pathologist, through post-mortem examination of the dead body, including
microscopic study of stained slide specimens made from minute bits of the principal
organs, is able to determine any changes in the architectural patterns of such body tissues,
and thus to identify the disease which produced them.
140. Pathological physiology: those deviations from normal functioning of particular
organs or bodily processes which are produced by disease or abnormal interferences.
141. Syndromes: see supra note 105.
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Undoubtedly, training or conditioning increases or decreases the threshold of vulnerability. Or, one may even reverse the viewpoint and see in the psychoneurotic an
individual with a talent or capacity for worry, fear, concern, and other emotional and
thinking mechanisms, possibly paralleling the function of imagination, which can be
developed to a very high degree. Whatever the point of view, it is necessary in our
opinion to take into account the pretraumatic personality for the purpose of discovering
what part of the total injury really represents a pre-existing neurotic constitution
merely expressing itself by more obvious symptoms in a neurotically constituted person.
The legal import of this concept is enormous. It means that persons who develop more
patent forms of neurosis in response to traumatic stimuli inadequate to so injure a
normal person, are not caused thereby to develop the neurosis as a new and original
condition. It is legally erroneous and socially unjust to compensate them on any such
4
theory."
Such cases are properly to be regarded as instances of aggravation of preexisting injuries or impairments, and so compensated modestly. The neurotic constitution is the major factor in the disability and it antedates the particular exacerbation
of symptoms for which the plaintiff seeks damages.
"It may also be accepted as true that all individuals have some tendency or
capacity to worry, to be fearful, to be concerned, and that all have some psychoneurotic
manifestations. This is much like saying that no one is free of bodily pathology, but
not thereby ill. As psychoneurotic mechanisms are well-nigh universal, one needs some
rule of thumb for making a diagnosis and evaluating the case under consideration. It is
a general working principle that when symptoms impede the efficiency of an individual
or make life pretty uncomfortable, the diagnosis may be justified. It must be remembered
that there need be no parallelism between the severity of symptoms and the effectiveness
of the individual. Many of the most efficient executives, researchers, teachers, physicians,
and lawyers have marked psychoneurotic phobias, anxiety states, compulsions, and
other symptoms. Nor is it possible to evaluate the amount of discomfort such symptoms
engender. In fact, there is often a suspicion that they give satisfaction, if not pleasure.
And in the literature and clinic, attention is given to the presumptive protective value
of the symptoms, their use for gaining some purposeful end, or their value as safety
valves.
"As the result of contributions to the study of the psychoneuroses by Janet, and
especially by Freud, it is generally conceded that the cause of psychoneurosis lies in
emotional and mental conflicts which have not been adequately faced or resolved, and
which have been pushed aside from the normal thinking processes of the individual.
The distress caused by the inability properly to resolve such conflicts is supposed to
give rise to various types of discomfort, and thus the symptoms represent a diffuse
form of expression. While this is the point of view held by the majority of students of
this subject, there is another school of thought which sees in the psychoneurotic an
individual with an organic defect in the form of a poorly knit or poorly constructed
nervous system. The latter point of view lacks sufficient scientific substantiation and
for this reason, at the present time, has relatively little support, although lip service
is generally given to the statement that if and when more information comes to hand,
the more psychological view may be modified.
"As already stated, it is the usual custom to describe rather than define the
psychoneuroses, and for purposes of exposition, this group of disorders is usually
subdivided into three or four categories; namely hysteria, neurasthenia, anxiety states,
and the compulsive, obsessive states. These categories are by no means mutually
exclusive, but, on the contrary, the symptoms characteristic of each category are likely
to be found in greater or less extent in a case falling in any group.

142. Most courts make the error of allowing full compensation, usually on the
assumption of a permanent injury, without perceiving the multiple differences between
traumatic neurosis and a straightforward lesion such as a fractured bone.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ Voi,. 4

1. CHARACTERIZATION OF HYSTERIA

"The main characteristic of hysteria is that symptoms are referable to the sensoryThus, the patient will present symptoms of paralysis, that is
motor nervous system'
motor weakness, or changes in sensation. The hysterical patient may present paralysis
of an extremity, of half of the body, or he may be unable to phonate and talk only in
a whisper, or he may be unable to talk at all (aphonia). Convulsions similar to those
seen in epilepsy may occur. In the sensory sphere, one meets patients showing areas of
anesthesia, that is, inability to appreciate touch, pain, or temperature changes; total
blindness, limitation of the field of vision, double vision. The patient may be completely
deaf, or show disorders of other special senses. Loss of memory (amnesia), double
personalities, and symptoms of this type, are also classified as hysterical. In other
words, those disorders not due to real changes within the nervous system, but giving
symptoms similar to those found in true pathology, apparently arising from psychologic
causes, form the group designated as hysteria.

2.

CHARACTERIZATION o

NEURASTHENIA

"The neurasthenic group has as its main symptoms the complaint of weakness, sense
of exhaustion, various pains, aches, and distress of a bodily nature, associated, as a
rule, with concern about the functions of various organs. Frequently in cases of this
group, one finds digestive distress, attacks of diarrhea, pain in the bladder with
frequent desire to micturate; " a feeling of pressure in the chest with concern about
the state of the heart; headaches with fear of brain tumor; difficulty in concentration;
disturbed sleep frequently resulting in a concern about sanity. With the preoccupation
of the sufferer with his bodily sensations and functions, the pleasure in living is greatly
reduced and a sense of futility and lack of interest occurs.
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF ANXIETY STATES
"In the anxiety states, one finds an individual who becomes extremely panicky
on occasions, usually without understanding of the reason for this panic. These attacks are
likely to be of relatively short duration, but represent real states of tremendous agitation.
Such states of necessity are accompanied by the physical component of acute fright,
namely, rapid pulse, strongly beating heart, tremors, cold perspiration, and a sense
of impending collapse. These physical signs which are part of fear and panic, naturally
lead the patient to have concern about his viscera.

4.

CHARACTERIZATION OF OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE SYNDROME

"The obsessive compulsive syndrome is manifested by the patient having the idea
that he is compelled or is likely to be compelled to carry out acts which are contrary
to his ordinary desires. Thus, in the compulsive syndrome, the individual may be greatly
distressed because he feels that he will throw himself out of a window; that he will
harm his child; that he will run some one down by automobile. The obsessive states
are those in which the individual has thoughts running through his mind of which
he cannot get rid. Because of unpleasant connotations, those thoughts or pictures
interrupt the ordinary flow of thinking and become extremely distressing. In this
category one also usually considers the phobias or fears, such as the fear of crossing
the street or being in closed places; the fear of riding on a street car or train, or going
more than a short distance from home; the fear of high places. These fears, which the
143. Sensory-motornervous system: Sense organs or receptors pick up various stimuli,
such as pain, heat, cold, pressure, and waves in the ether conveying visual and auditory
impressions. Such stimuli are transmitted over sensory pathways or nerve fibers to the
spinal cord and brain. At some central point, they are appropriately organized and
interpreted as a basis for adapted action by the organism. Such action occurs through
the discharge of "motor" centers, this giving rise to impulses which pass over motor
pathways and nerves to produce a response in some effector organ, usually a muscle or
gland.
144. Micturate: to urinate.
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individual will agree are unreasonable and contrary to his better judgment, nevertheless
lead to a sense of panic if he tries to do the thing which produces the fear 5
"As one might anticipate, the compulsive syndrome is rarely the basis of claim
in traumatic neurosis, but obsessive states about the permanence of disability and fears
for family are commonly linked with general reactions in the neuroses of injured
workmen.
"The reader will have observed that all these symptoms and symptom-complexes,
except those of the hysterical states, are primarily subjective. It is what the individual
thinks and feels or fears that is important. To the extent that these subjective feelings
interfere with normal living, working, and playing are they serious and disabling.
The objective evaluation can be made only by watching the behavior of the individual.
If the phobiac never leaves his room because of the state of fear and panic such an
attempt produces, one must conclude that it has disturbed the entire tenor of his life."
(2) Test plaintiff's medical 'witnesses to see whether required physical,

neurological, 'psychiatricand psychologcial examinations have been done in
reaching diagnosis and prognosis.
Space limitations will not permit extensive discussion of the requisites
of a sound psychiatric examination but the lawyer is urged to read the

excellent study on this subject prepared by Dr. Gaylord P. Coon, Boston
Psychopathic Hospital, as part of the Second National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine.' 46 Therein will be found
ample material for testing the psychiatric competency of the alleged expert.
(3) Try to make medical witnesses concede that plaintiff's complaints
are not residual symptoms of organic injury to the brain.
Accepting the foregoing postulates concerning the psychoneuroses, it
follows that symptoms arising as the result of organic brain injury due to
trauma, are not properly considered as psychoneuroses. Whether the traumatic
brain injury is in the -form of cerebral concussion, hemorrhage or contusion,
does not alter this statement.
Symptoms arising from traumatic brain damage often have a remarkable similarity to those of a true psychoneurosis, and are distinguishable
chiefly by objective evidences of real organic brain changes. Such evidences
are protracted periods of unconsciousness; blood in the cerebrospinal fluid and
increased intracranial pressure, both discoverable by the diagnostic expedient
of lumbar puncture; 147 changes in reflexes,' 148 motor weakness and sensory
145. A young man training to be an electrical engineer was almost electrocuted
while gaining summer experience as a lineman. He developed mixed symptoms of
neurasthenia and hysteria, in part manifested by temporary paralysis followed by involuntary twitching and shaking of his muscles, and by a deep-rooted dread and fear of
electricity which presented a serious obstacle to the pursuit of his chosen profession.
Verdict and judgment for P for $7,500; affirmed on appeal. Summerskill v. Vermont
Power & Mfg. Co., 91 Vt. 251, 99 Atl. 1017 (1917).
146. Coon, Psychiatry for the Lawyer: Requisites of a Sound Mental Examination,
26 B.U.L. REv. 272 (1946).
147. Lumbar puncture: See note 33, supra.
148. Reflexes: If the nervous system is in normal condition, the examiner will get
reflex responses when he taps with a rubber hammer on those spots where various nerve
pathways are stimulated. In certain disease states, the reflexes are exaggerated, and in
others, reduced or absent. These findings are of diagnostic value to a competent expert.
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changes of specific neurological variety ;149 and mental changes that can be
directly associated with disorder of brain structure. In many cases, the decision as to whether symptoms are the result of traumatic injury or are of a
psychoneurotic nature, is a matter of judgment rather than a matter of
definite objective differentiation. In addition, it frequently happens that there
is a combination of the effects of organic brain disturbances and psychoneurotic
symptomatology. The latter may at times mask the former. 50
As the effects of traumatic injury to the brain recede, psychoneurotic
manifestations may take the foreground among the presenting symptoms.
These -factors produce difficult practical problems of decision, but do not
affect the underlying theoretical concepts about the psychoneuroses.
Defendant's counsel should try to show by cross-examination that the
head trauma was trivial; that the criteria of organic injury to the brain have
not been satisfied by plaintiff's clinical history; '1' that medical study has been
too cursory to justify the diagnosis and/or prognosis, various essential diagnostic steps, techniques and instrumentalities having been neglected; that
proper psychological studies have not been carried out; that the symptoms
complained of pre-existed the injury; that they appear only at moments of
particular emotional stress; that they first developed after an independent
accident occurring subsequent to the traumatic episode in, litigation; that the
impact was not to the head but to a remote part of the body, hence the
symptoms complained of cannot be due to brain damage but must be psychological; that the stimulus was such that it would produce no reaction in
a person of average good physical and psychic health, hence plaintiff's symptoms bespeak a pre-traumatic neurotic personality. Some of the suggestions
which follow reiterate and elaborate these several possible approaches.

(4) Show throughplaintiff's medical witness that only a small percentage
of traumatic neurosis cases arise following serious associated injuries, the
majority developing after a relatively minor impact or injury. Establish the
fact that plaintiff's claim falls in this latter group. Ask the witness if psycdiatric opinion is not agreed that in this group, the impact or injury is to'
be regarded as the occasion rather than the cause of neurotic difficulties. Seek
149. Specific neurological variety: the nervous system is so constructed and organized
that a sufficiently severe organic injury at any point can be localized by the peripheral
effects which it will produce.
150. Claimant, a bus driver, was shot in the back of his head by a bandit while
he was at work. This caused substantial injury to the occipital lobes of his brain. I-Ie
became subject to various symptoms: irritability, fatigability, frequent headaches, intolerance to heat, nervousness, restlessness, weakness, forgetfulness, impaired power of concentration and insomnia. An examination of his nervous system yielded negative results.
Nevertheless, a specialist in nervous and mental diseases was of opinion that his symptoms
were due to brain injury rather than to hysteria. Claimant was awarded workmen's
compensation benefits on the basis of permanent and total disability. On appeal, this award
was affirmed. Maddux v. Kansas City Public Serv. Co., 111 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1937).
Another illustrative case is Hawthorn v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc., 9 La. App,
660, 119 So. 772 (1929).
151. See supra, notes 21 and 51.
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medical admissions that other causes are partially responsible for plaintiff's
reactions and that, at most, his present condition only involves aggravation of
pre-existing neurotic personality, not primary causation of neurosis in an
individual previously nonneurotic.
Smith and Solomon discuss these medico-legal aspects in detail, making
the various points set out below, and concluding: 152
"Our opinion is that all cases of traumatic neurosis, and particularly those following
trivial stimuli, should be compensated on a conservative basis with damages restricted
to modest levels. This point of view seems to us to be required by several considerations, namely:
"a. The basis of compensation depends upon subjective symptoms;
"b. There are independent causes, of substantial weight, operative in all

traumatic neurosis cases;

'c.The defendant's act is usually a trivial stimulus which merely calls forth
expression of a pre-existing neurotic diathesis or constitution, and thus tends to
be a trigger mechanism rather than a substantial cause;

"d. Diagnosis and evaluation depend on statements of the patient as to nature
and severity of his symptoms, and there may be no adequate verification or method
of objective measurement;
"e. Malingering is very difficult to prove, but is often present in conscious or
unconscious form, and almost always there is unconscious exaggeration of
symptoms." 15

These authors make many substantiating observations which might well
guide both the defendant's cross-examination and the judge's views of what
is reasonable and excessive compensation. They show, among other things,
that:
(1) Medical examiner and lawyer must determine whether the traumatic
neurosis in question represents the more common example of aggravation of
pre-existing neurotic impairment or one of the rarer cases of traumatic
neurosis arising de novo in a person of average constitution.15 4
Smith and Solomon observe that a neurosis may appear for the first
time in a person previously possessed of average constitution and health,
following severe head injuries, particularly if the total approach to the injured
person is calculated to produce anxieties and brooding about his condition
and future fate. But in studying all reported court cases from a combined
psychiatric and legal viewpoint, they found that in s of traumatic neurosis
claims the allegedly causal stimulus or injury was so trivial (a bump or a
bruise, etc.) as to be obviously inadequate (even in the knowledge of laymen)
to affect a person of average nervous and psychic constitution. Thus, such
152. In their article, supra note 137, at 133.
153. From the legal standpoint, only conscious and willful fraud or misstatement
concerning a disability is malingering.

154. See Smith and Solomon, supra note 137; and Ruesch, Harris and Bowman, Preand Post-Traumatic Personality in Head Injuries, in TRAuMA oF THE CENTRAL NEavous
SYsTEMt 507 (1945). Among the interesting conclusions of these authors is the following:
"All the results obtained seem to indicate that the post-traumatic personality is more
dependent on the pre-traumatic personality than on factors related to the injury." Id. at 539.
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cases are self-declaratory of plaintiff's pre-existing impairment. Courts should
take judicial notice of that fact. 155
(2) In cases of neurosis following trivial stimuli, a competent psychiatrist usually can find tell-tale confirmation of pre-existing impairmcnt in
plaintiff's past medical and social history.
It is no answer that plaintiff was previously able to work, as this is not
incompatible with a pronounced degree of neurosis."" Pertinent inquiries
involve:
a. Medical history. What doctors has patient seen and for what complaints? The medical history of a neurotic shows vague symptoms, oftentimes
multiple, which do not incriminate any particular organ.
b. Past school record.
c. Matrimonial harmony or discord.
d. Attitude toward job. Nature of past employment. Work record and
promotions. Ability to hold strenuous job. Neurotics tend to remain for long
periods at jobs where special concessions of various kinds are made to them.
(3) Nervous shock must not be confused with traumatic neurosis.
As Smith and Cobb state, 15 7 nervous shock from psychic stimuli (great
fright, etc.) produces only relatively transient upset or disability through
excessive physiological responses, except where the stimuli have a continuing
force or repetitive operation, or where such responses cause injury by acting
upon a pre-existing state of vulnerability. Nervous shock per se produces
traumatic neurosis no more than trauma, for that sequel is not a physiological
but a psychological response. The neurotically disposed recipient of physical
or psychic trauma, often reacts to it as a focal experience or organizational
point for the further elaboration of his neurotic symptoms. Thus nervous
shock and traumatic neurosis are not the same phenomena. Many persons
will suffer transient nervous shock from psychic stimuli such as great fear,
who will never progress to the development of a traumatic neurosis. Conversely, some persons who sustain no immediate nervous shock will begin
to develop neurotic symptoms a few hours or a few days after the focal cx perience, thus illustrating that independent forces and more devious mechanisms
are involved in the appearance of neurosis.' 8
(4) In the usual case of traumatic neurosis, symptoms are imultiplied
and exaggerated as a result of independent causes, and the patient's plight
appears to be worse than it is.
Neurotic persons (trivial stimulus cases) are almost always very suggestible. Such an individual may readily adopt the belief that his body struck
155. See authorities cited supra note 155.

156. Ibid.

157. Smith and Cobb, Relation of Emotions to In jury and Discase: Legal Liabililtv
for Psychic Stihldi,30 VA. L. R.. 193 (1944), also in 19"ANN. INT. MED. 873 (1943).
158. Smith and Solomon, supra note 137, at 123.
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the cross bar of a street car seat when no such bar or obstruction was there.
Neurotic symptoms are greatly aggravated by the anxiety and excitement of
litigation, a fact which the defendant is entitled to prove. 15 These apprehensions about the oncoming trial are due partially to fear by such persons that
their claims of injury will be disbelieved or held in contempt for want of
objective lesions. Also, the self-serving mechanisms involved in neurosis invariably cause some degree of unconscious exaggeration or malingering in
respect to symptoms, as the neurotic desires to be believed and wants his
complaints to be convincing. Suggestions made by relatives and lawyers and
the continuance of disability payments are additional extrinsic factors which
cause neurotic symptoms to be aggravated or exaggerated. Thus the neurosis
is not so bad as it seems, and the conclusion of litigation will usually cause
60
many of the symptoms engendered by it to disappear.
Example: Plaintiff, an actress known on the vaudeville and concert stage as "The
Sweet Singer of the South" was playing an engagement in a Baltimore theatre; through
negligence of defendant's stage hands in manipulating a curtain, a length of pipe fell,
brushing her head and neck and striking her on one ankle. No one could say with
assurace that it actually did come in contact with her head. Physicians were unable to
find any organic injury to account for the numerous nervous symptoms she developed
including apparent paralysis on the right side and marked impairment of her ability
so to speak (hysterical aphonia.) At the trial of her tort action, plaintiff appeared in
court on crutches, aided to the witness stand by her father, appearing to be a pathetic,
wasted, hopeless invalid. Records were played in court to illustrate the quality of her
voice before the accident and photographs of her were put in evidence to show her
previous robust appearance. Medical experts agreed that her symptoms were due to
a traumatic neurosis, without organic injury, but whereas defendant's physicians
prophesied a speedy return of health after termination of the litigation, plaintiff's
doctors testified she probably would never be able to sing again. The jury returned
a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $50,000 and afterward, the defense dismissed its proposed appeal and entered into a compromise settlement for $40,000. As subsequent
evidence reveals, within a few months plaintiff was fully recovered, singing in concert
once again, with music critics pronouncing her voice "richer and better than ever." "
This case illustrates several truths about traumatic neurosis: the patient
is never as badly off as he appears, the symptoms often lend themselves to
dramatic presentation in court, the trier of fact is apt to gain the false impression that the plaintiff has sustained a calamitous, permanent disability and
that the symptoms are entirely due to the defendant's fault. It demonstrates
how the stresses, strains and excitement of litigation exacerbate symptoms,
causing them on trial to appear more severe than they are. It shows, also,
159. Neurotic symptoms may be caused, or aggravated by, environmental influences
or the circumstances of litigation, but the defendant is not liable for a worsening of
plaintiff's condition produced by such independent causes. Stackpole v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 121 Fed. 389 (C.C.D. Ore. 1903) ; Redden v. Public Service R.R., 79 N.J.L. 402, 75
Atl. 179 (1910) ; Robinson v. Spokane Traction Co., 47 Wash. 303, 91 Pac. 972 (1907);
and see Eagan v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P.2d 821 (1933).
160. Smith and Solomon, supra note 137, at 125 et seq.
161. Id. at 115 et seq.
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how rapid and unexpected may be the complete cure induced by a compromise
settlement.
(5) Even though plaintiff has various nervous symptoms, try to show,
through cross-examination of plaintiff's physician, that plaintiff cannot be
said to be suffering from traumatic neurosis occasioned by the episode in,
litigation.

One or two symptoms or findings will not suffice: exaggerated reflexes, 0 2
for instance, may be found in many situations that do not warrant the diagnosis. Pains, aches, dizziness and other symptoms suggestive of neurosis
may be due, in whole or in part, to pre-existing illness, not neurotic in character,0 3 or to previous major operations, 0 4 or to hormonal imbalance due
to the menopause in women between 40 and 50 years of age.10 5 In some cases
it is possible to show that the plaintiff had a full blown neurosis before occurrence of the episode asserted to have caused it, 60 in which event juries usually
67
allow little or no compensation.
The plaintiff must be able to trace the onset of symptoms with proper
time relations, to a focal experience, traumatic or psychic, and to show a
clinically accepted progression pattern. These are very important requirements
from the standpoint of medical proof.
There is no doubt that some general practitioners of medicine, or careless
witnesses, are prone to fasten the diagnosis of "traumatic neurosis" to a
collection of miscellaneous symptoms, many of long standing duration, found
162. Rcflexes: see note 148, siupra.
163. Wellman v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 219 Mo. 126, 118 S.W. 31 (1909) (preexisting female complaints and neurosis: $7500 verdict reduced to 3500) ; O'Flanagan
v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 129 S.W. 1019 (Mo. App. 1910) (pre-existing nervous condition);
Galveston, H-. & S.A.R.R. v. Kellogg, 172 S.W. 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (expert
evidence left proof of causation ambiguous and conjectural as to whether neurotic
symptoms were produced by accident, by independent disease or by pre-existing
neurasthenia.)
164. Brennan v. City of Streator, 256 Ill. 476, 100 N.E. 266 (1912); Billings v.
Snohomish, 51 Wash. 135, 98 Pac. 107 (1908) (previous major operation, followed by
strenuous exertion).
165. Tate v. Western Union Tel. Co., 339 Mo. 262, 96 S.W.2d 364 (1936) ; Lockwood
v. Twenty-third St. Ry., 15 Daly 374, 7 N.Y. Supp. 663 (C.P. 1889).

166. In Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 267 S.W. 400 (1924), the jury returned a

verdict for defendant. In McQuade v. The Golden Rule, 105 Minn. 326, 117 N.W. 484,
(1908), the stimulus was suspiciously trivial and the jury awarded plaintiff only 1,2000. In
Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. App. 4 (1901), plaintiff framed her action on the theory that

defendant's willful tort aggravated her pre-existing neurasthenia;the jury awarded her only
$500. In Mollman v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 206 Mo. App. 253. 227 S.W.
264 (1921), the stimulus was very insubstantial and the jury awarded plaintiff only $500
for hysteria allegedly caused thereby. In Cook v. Village of Mohawk, 207 N.Y. 311, 100
N.E. 815 (1913), plaintiff's pre-existing impairment was obvious and the jury allowed
only $1000 to compensate both property damage due to defendant's negligence in flooding
her land, and plaintiff's hysterical symptoms allegedly caused thereby. See Davis v.
Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939), involving alleged traumatic
hysteria, where the jury returned a verdict for defendant. In Simone v. Rhode Island Co.,
28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202, 9 L.R.A. (xN.s.) 740 (1907), a case of alleged traumatic
neurasthenia, defendant offered strong evidence tending to show that plaintiff's complaints
were due to her previous physical condition and to independent causes; the jury awarded
plaintiff only $400.

167. See note 166 supra.
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in a patient pressing a 'medico-legal claim. Such diagnostic errors lead, of
course, to unjust enrichment of the plaintiff by "sweetening the verdict," and
the defendant is thus made to pay for pre-existing poor health which he did
not cause. Courts, where new practice and procedure acts authorize the step,
should appoint competent, impartial psychiatrists to examine and appraise
cases of alleged traumatic neurosis.
(6) Inasmuch as 12 to 36 months may elapse between stimulus and trial
due to congestion of the courts, and that part of the neurotic symptoms of
which plaintiff complains may be traceable to independent, post-accident
causes, the latter possibility requires close investigation. Seek to elicit an
admission from plaintiff's physicians that part or all of his symptoms may be
due to such unrelated causes.'6 3
(7) To prove that the stimulus (traunzatic or psychic) created by defendant actually caused plaintiff's neurotic symptoms, it must be shown that
some or all of the characteristicsymptoms appeared within a reasonable time
after receipt of the stimulus.
A vulnerable person, long after an accident which caused no serious consequences, may brood about what could have happened to him and in that
event to his family, with the result that he develops a late anxiety neurosis.
This should not be compensable.' 0 9 Causation is obscure enough, at best, in
traumatic neurosis cases, and proof of causal relation becomes too conjectural
to be trusted, when a symptom-free period of more than a few hours, or at
most of a few days, separates the stimulus and onset of the disabling symptoms. The plaintiff must be required to prove satisfactory bridging symptoms
to connect stimulus and late neurosis, such as speedy and persistent complaints
of pain, substantial nervous shock, or prompt and continuing symptoms
10
showing altered psychological behavior.'
168. As in Gannon v. S. S. Kresge, 114 Conn. 36, 157 Atl. 541 (1931) ; and Hunter
v. Fleming, 7 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. App. 1928).
169. Where the disability has arisen from anxiety, worry or brooding over the
proceedings for compensation, or has arisen from a cause unrelated to the accident
itself, there is no right of compensation. California Notion & Toy Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 59 Cal. App. 225, 210 Pac. 524 (1922) ; Plodzyk v. Connecticut Coke
Co., 116 Conn. 297, 164 At. 636 (1933) ; Eller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 228 Iowa
124, 291 N.W. 866 (1940) ; Schneyder v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 280 Mich. 127, 273 N.W.
418 (1937) ; Drexl v. Jurgensen, 19 N.J. Misc. 643, 22 A.2d 816 (1941) ; Holt v. Yates
and Thorn, 3 B.W.C.C. 75 (Eng. 1909).
A mental state or nervous disturbance caused merely by pendency of compensation
proceedings is even less necessarily referable to the injury. Coffey v. Coffey Laundries,
Inc., 108 Conn. 493, 143 Ati. 880 (1928); and see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 46 Ariz. 162, 49 P.2d 391 (1935).
170. In many cases damages have been allowed for traumatic neurosis where the
symptom-free time interval between the stimulus and alleged injury was so great as
to disprove causal connection or to render it speculative. See cases cited in Smith and
Solomon, supra note 137, at 127, n.59. For a valuable article discussing the necessary
reasoning process in linking cause and effect, see Brahdy and Cahn, Clinical Approach to
Alleged Traumatic Disease, 23 B.U.L. REv. 238 (1943), also in 18 AxN. IxT. MED.
491 (1943), a study in the National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law
and Medicine.
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(8) Traumatic neurosis cannot be regarded as a permanen disability.
Many courts have upheld excessive awards for traumatic neurosis due
to their mistaken impression that the condition involves a permanent disability. 171 This is perhaps the most common misconception which now distorts
the calculation of a just compensation. 172 Many medical witnesses contribute
to this misapprehension by testifying loosely that the condition "is of uncertain
or indefinite duration." 1" We do not have adequate medical grounds to
warrant such a prognosis. There is extremely good evidence that the average
case of traumatic neurosis recovers speedily, but not longer than 3-5 years,
after a lump sum settlement is effected or the litigation is terminated. There
may be rare exceptions involving a certain amount of irreparable injury due
to the atrophy of disuse, if a hysterical contracture persists long enough for
74
extensive changes to occur.'
(9) Require plaintiffs' physician to admit, if it has been contcndcd that
traumatic neurosis may result in a brain abscess or in insanity (psychosis),
that there is no medical basis for such hypothetical complications.
Plaintiff's physicians have testified that traumatic neurosis may lead to
brain abscess 175 but this shows incredible imposition, for brain abscess is due
to infection. Another claim sometimes made by medical witnesses is that the
neurosis may pass into a psychosis, that is to say, frank insanity.'70 Some
17 7
courts seem to think that neuroses and psychoses are brothers and sisters.
Such a relationship is not proven, nor indeed credited; we have no scientific
proof, or clinical evidence, that neurosis is a step on the way to psychosis. 178
(10) Show, if possible, that physicians testifying for the plaintiff are
general practitioners,with little or no experience of psychiatric matters, revcal171. See Smith and Solomon supra note 137, at 127, n.60, for lengthy list of such
cases, in many of which the error was discovered in trial or appellate court with consequent reduction of the award.
172. See note 171, supra.
173. See, for instance, St. Louis, Iron M. & S.R.R. v. Osborne, 95 Ark. 310, 129 S.W.
537 (1910) ; Borski v. Wakefield, 239 Mich. 656, 215 N.W. 19 (1927) ; and other cases
cited in Smith and Solomon, supra note 137, at 128, n.62.
174. Smith and Solomon, supra note 137, at 128 et seq.
175. See Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. DeLong, 109 Il1.App. 241 (1903), where a medical
witness testified that neurastheniaoften results in dementia or abscess of the brain.
A plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for a future operation reasonably certain
to be required as a result of defendant's negligence, but it is an imposition for the
physician to swell the verdict by testifying that neurasthenia requires surgery-as in
Hayes v. Shoemaker, 302 Pa. 72, 152 Atl. 827 (1930). Surgery is not recognized as a

desirable form of psychotherapy (treatment by suggestion) in cases of traumatic neurosis.
176. Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. DeLong, 109 IIl. App. 241 (1903): Walner v. Sorentino,
288 Mass. 75, 192 N.E. 503 (1934) ; Borski v. City of Wakefield, 239 Mich. 656, 215 N.W.
19 (1927).

177. The court said in Morris v. International Ry., 174 App. Div. 61, 159 N.Y. Supp.
993, 994-95 (4th Dep't 1916) "In medical understanding, hysteria is the borderline
of insanity."

178. Early stages of schizophrenia, one type of psychosis, may produce symptoms
similar to neurosis, causing an error in diagnosis, but any such confusion will be resolved
as the psychosis progresses, and there is no evidence that neurosis progresses into
schizophrenia.
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ing by every means possible the conjectural and unsubstantiatedcharacter of
their diagnoses and prognoses. Contrast, if possible, the specialist qualifications of the medical witnesses who have studied plaintiff, and his condition, at
the request of the defendant or court.
This objective is well worth striving for since courts today are more
disposed than heretofore to consider whether a large award for a neuropsychiatric disability, resting on testimony of general practitioners only, and
not founded on a reasonably systematic examination of the nervous system
and psyche, may require to be reduced or set aside where contrary to the solid
79
evidence of well-respected, accredited specialists.'
(11) The problems of malingering must be carefully explored, but the
simulation of mental and nervous symptoms is considered hereafter as a
80
discrete, unified subject.'
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
ALLEGED NEUROIVSYCHIATRIC DISA1ILITY: INJURIES

ALLEGEDLY DUE TO PsYcHIC STIMULI
Legal claims for injury imputed to fright alone began to appear in the
courts of Great Britain and the United States between 1880 and 1890. At
first the House of Lords, in the case of Victorian Railways Commission v.
Coultas,ls ' flatly refused to admit the possibility that a defendant might
become liable in tort to a plaintiff whom he had injured solely by behavior
which subjected him to great and sudden fright. But the reasons assigned
for denying liability in this intriguing species of case were legally and scientifically unsound,18 2 and the British Courts quickly adopted a contrary rule ' 83
and have since applied the general principle of legal responsibility 'for psychic
stimuli culpably caused to the widest variety of situations. 8 4 Apparently
179. Johnson v. Great Northern Ry., 107 Minn. 285, 119 N.W. 1061 (1909);
Waterman v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M. Ry., 26 N.D. 540, 145 N.W. 19 (1913).
For application of principle in Workmen's Compensation field, see Burton v. Norwich
Union Indemnity Ins. Co., 146 So. 897 (La. App. 1933).
In Woodward v. Longino & Collins, Inc., 155 So. 503 (La. App. 1934), the trial
court credited report of impartial physician, based on five examinations, that hysterical
paralysis of Negro fireman's arm was simulated, and this despite the fact that two
physicians testifying for plaintiff considered the hysteria genuine and that plaintiff showed
no pain response when a lighted cigarette was applied to the back of his hand in open
court. Alfirmed.
180. See infra, pp.
et seq.
181. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
182. These grounds were as follows: (1) damages of this character are too remote,
as injury is not an ordinary consequence of fright; (2) recognition of actionable injury
would lead to increased litigation; (3) to allow damages inevitably would raise formidable problems of proof and encourage a host of flimsy claims and fictitious suits; (4)
there was no precedent in English law for liability in such cases. Smith and Cobb, Relation
of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv.
193 (1944), also in 19 ANx. INTr. MED. 873 (1943).
183. Bell v. Great Northern R.R., L.R. 26 Ir. 428 (1890); Dulieu v. White & Sons,
[1901] 2 K.B. 669. See cases cited in Smith and Cobb, supra note 182.
184. See Smith and Cobb, supra note 182.
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without any knowledge of the early cases being decided in other jurisdictions,
Justice Gaines of the Texas Supreme Court, held in the case of Hill v.
Kimball 185 that the absence of physical impact is no bar to liability if the
proof shows that the defendant culpably exposed the plaintiff to psychic
stimuli which were calculated to, and did, cause injury.
At about the same time that these epochal precedents were being laid
down, the New York 1s0 and Massachusetts courts,18 7 doubtless actuated by
difficulties of proof and fears of fraudulent imposition, interpolated a purely
administrative requirement into the liability formula by refusing to permit
damages for injury due to fright unless the episode involved a contemporaneous tortious impact against the plaintiff's body.l1s
At the turn of the century it appeared that the New York-Massachusetts
rule would become the majority view in American jurisdictions, as regards
tort liability -forpsychic stimuli, but today the British-Texas view has become
the prevailing rule in this country, 8 9 and, it is believed, properly so.190
Both "impact" and "non-impact" jurisdictions agree on certain principles
regarding legal liability for psychic stimuli, these being as follows:
(1) If A negligently injures B by physical impact, however trivial the
blow or injury, courts permit B to recover damages for fright, pain and
mental anguish consequent thereto. By this process of "tacking on," compensation is allowed for psychic disturbance by way of so-called "parasitic damages"
when no primary recovery could be had for the latter standing alone. 19
(2) Assume that there is no impact or injury inflicted from without,
and, indeed, no harm done to B productive of disability. By creating or continuing a psychic stimulus, A negligently causes B to suffer mental anguish
1 2
or transient fright. Courts refuse to recognize any liability on the part of A.
185. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
186. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
187. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
188. There is no justification for this in logic, and experience has demonstrated that
no lesser volume of litigation has resulted in the "impact" jurisdictions than in those
which dispense with it. Smith and Cobb, supra note 182. Today, "impact" jurisdictions
consider the most trivial touching sufficient, showing a waning enthusiasm for this
arbitrary requirement, and it is immaterial whether the impact occurs before or after
the plaintiff's exposure to the psychic stimulus. Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92
N.E. 1010 (1910) (receipt of superficial bruise sufficient) ; Kisiel v. Holyoke St. Ry., 240
Mass. 29, 132 N.E. 622 (1921) (impact without visible discoloration sufficient) ; Comstock
v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (jarring of plaintiff by trivial impact of
defendant's car against her husband's automobile held sufficient).
189. Contemporaneous impact necessary (Ark., Ill., Ind., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich.,
Mo., N.J., N.Y., Ohio, Pa.) Injury through psychic stimuli actionable without proof of
impact (Ala., Cal., Conn., Ga., Iowa, Kan., La., Md., Minn., Mont., Neb., N.H., N.C.,
Ore., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Wash., W. Va., Wis.) For citations of cases in these
various jurisdictions, see Smith and Cobb, supra note 182.
190. The majority rule is consonant with the general philosophy of the law of torts
in impoiing liability for injury culpably caused and with scientific recognition, today,
that injury may possibly result from intense emotional stimuli-s.uch as fright.
191. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285. 47 N.E. 88 (1897), S.C. 172 Mass.
488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899).
192. Wyman v. Leavitt. 71 Me. 227 (1880).
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Some of these courts regard B's complaint as too insubstantial to constitute legal injury, there being no resultant disability; some feel social policy
would not be served by making the law of torts an orchid shop, a likely result
if ruffled feelings would bring money damages. Still other courts seem to
recognize mental tranquillity as an interest entitled to protection against
negligent invasion but decline to extend the remedy of damages because no
objective standard exists for their measurement, the harm being purely subjective. 19 3 Whatever the ground relied upon, the courts are unanimous in
denying money damages for merely zegligent invasions of mental tranquillity. 19 4
(3) Assume there is no impact or injury inflicted from without, but A
wilf idly or maliciously causes B to suffer mental anguish. Courts are agreed
that B may recover damages for this intentional behavior even though it causes
him no physical injury or disability, but only an oppressive and undesirable
disturbance of mental tranquillity. 19 5
(4) If the facts are identical with those just stated (3 supra) except
that B suffers, in addition to mental anguish, consequent nervous shock or
other disabling injury, the wrongdoer, A, is a fortiori liable in damages. The
injury being objective, and more amenable to proof and evaluation, the case
for liability is stronger than it is where the harm alleged is subjective only.19
(5) Assume that A negligently creates a condition of peril threatening
injury to a class of persons of which B is a member. B acts reasonably in the
emergency to escape apprehended risk of injury and his defensive-protective
actions cause him to suffer traumatic injury. B may recover damages for his
physical injuries and for attendant -fright, nervous shock, and pain. 19
(6) Assume that A negligently creates or continues a frightening stimulus. B reacts spontaneously, even automatically, in a not unforeseeable
manner, fainting or falling to the ground, or in some other manner suffers
injury "from without." B may recover damages for his physical injuries and
for attendant fright, nervous shock, and pain. 9 8
193. Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
194. Kansas City Ry. v. Dalton, 65 Kan. 661, 70 Pac. 645 (1902); Canning v.
Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451 (Maos. 1848); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Trott,
86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (1894). For collected cases, see Notes, 23 A.L.R. 365 (1923),
44 A.L.R. 429 (1926), 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928).
195. Barnett v. Collection Service, 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932).
196. Warmelink v. Tissue, 257 Mich. 228, 241 N.W. 203 (1932). Intentionally
shooting at motorists was held to amount to an assault and despite the fact that
plaintiff was not touched, defendant was liable in damages for sickness caused by plaintiff's
fear. The rule of Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899) requiring
impact in cases of injury negligently caused did not apply. Accord: Janvier v. Sweeney,
[1919] 2 K.B. 316; Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
197. Bachelder v. Morgan, 179 Ala. 339. 60 So. 815 (1912); and cases cited in
Smith and Cobb, supra note 182, at 317, app. B4.
198. In Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 Atl. 210 (1930), plaintiff fainted from
fright and fell to the floor when defendant's car negligently crashed into the window of
her store. See Smith and Cobb, supra note 182, at 230, n.133.
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(7) Jurisdictions which require contemporaneous impact in tort cases
as a prerequisite to liability for injury from psychic stimuli, usually make no
such requirement in Workmen's Compensation cases.1 9
The scientific learning concerning the relations of emotions to injury and
disease belongs to the new field of Psychosomatic Medicine which first began
to attract wide attention, and to stimulate extensive clinical investigation in
about 1930. Clinical evidence that emotional stress may produce symptoms
had been increasing since 1900,200 but the scientific roots of modern Psychosomatic Medicine are to be found in the experimental work of Dr. Walter B.
Cannon, Harvard's eminent physiologist, demonstrating the remarkable physiological changes produced in a cat by powerful emotion.201 In his second
great book, The Wisdom of the Body, Cannon summed up these responses
as follows :
"It is remarkable that most of these reactions occur as the accompaniment of the
powerful emotions of rage and fear. Respiration deepens, the heart beats more rapidly,
the arterial pressure rises, the blood is shifted away from the stomach and intestines

to the heart and central nervous system and the muscles, the processes in the alimentary
canal cease, sugar is freed from the reserves in the liver, the spleen contracts and discharges its content of concentrated corpuscles, and adrenin is secreted from the adrenal
medulla.
"The emotional responses just listed may reasonably be regarded as preparatory
for struggle. They are adjustments which, so far as possible, put the organism in
readiness for meeting the demands which will be made upon it. The secreted adrenin
cooperates with sympathetic nerve impulses in calling forth stored glycogen from the
liver, thus flooding the blood with sugar for the use of laboring muscles; it helps in
distributing the blood in abundance to the heart, the brain, and the limbs (i.e., to the
parts essential for intense physical effort) while taking it away from the inhibited
organs in the abdomen; it quickly abolishes the effects of muscular fatigue so that
the organism which can muster adrenin in the blood can restore to its tired muscles
the same readiness to act which they had when fresh; and it renders the blood more
readily coagulable. The increased respiration, the redistributed blood running at high
pressure, and the more numerous red corpuscles set free from the spleen provide for
essential oxygen and for riddance of acid waste, and make a setting for instantaneous
and supreme action. In short, all these changes are directly serviceable in rendering
the organism more effective in the violent display of energy which fear or rage may
involve."
199. Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922). For collected
cases, see Smith and Cobb, supra note 182, at 230, n.134.
200. ALmcAN, ANAToMIscHE ORGANKRANKHEITEN Aus SEELISCHE URSACHE (1930);

DUNBAR, E.,,OTIONS AND BODILY CHANGES (2d ed. 1938); DUNBAR, PSYCHOSOMATIC
DIAGNOSIS (1943) ; MoHR, PSYCHO-PHYsISCHE BEHANDLUNGSMETHODEN (1925) ; Wmss
AND ENGLISH, PSYCHOSOMATIC MIEDIClNn (1943).

The basic observation that leads on to all other considerations of psychogenic lesions,
is that a blister can be raised on the skin by hypnotic suggestion and removed by tie
same means. Three competent observers with expert witnesses have reported that this
happened-Kreibrik, 1907, Kohnstmann and Pinner, 1908, and Schlindler, 1927. The latter
wrote a monograph in which he describes not only blisters but subcutaneous hemorrhages
caused by hypnosis and eliminated by- hypnosis. SCHLINDLER, NERVEN-SYSTME VUN
SPONTANE BLUTUNGEN (1927).
201. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN HUNGER, FEAR, PAIN AND RAGE (1920).
202. CANNON, WISDOM 0P THE BODY 227-28 (Rev. ed. 1939).
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Smith and Cobb 203 have taken systems and organs mentioned by Cannon
as responding physiologically to fear and rage, and prepared a table showing
the disorders of these systems best known to accompany emotional stress in
man, citing readers to the leading scientific literature.2 0 4
The authors then undertook to subject 301 reported law suits involving
alleged injury by fright, to combined psychiatric-legal analysis, focusing upon
the nature of the stimuli, and responses and the adequacy of proof to establish
prinzd facie liability.20 5 The conclusions reached were very instructive and the
scientific concepts and criteria brought forward there have a direct bearing
upon the problems of cross-examination with which we are concerned here.
Counsel should see if plaintiff's physician will not agree to all, or part, of
the following propositions:
(1) When a human being is sufficiently frightened, the effect is to
20 7
stimulate the adrenal glands 206 and possibly other endocrine glands.
Adrenalin is released into the blood stream and the sympathetic nervous
system is stimulated with the general result that the organism is mobilized
for "fight-flight" reactions.
(2) As a general thing, the foregoing reactions are protective in nature,
and hence, rarely result in injury, as witness the scarcity of serious injury
due to fright produced by the holocaust of war and battle.
(3) The physiological reactions set in motion are reversed in a normal
person when the emotional stimulus subsides.
(4) It is known that some persons undergo excessive physiological and
psychological reactions to fright. It would seem that the latter may Tfurther
stimulate the former. Such persons may develop a state of "nervous shock,"
with development of a variety of disabling symptoms, but this passes away
rapidly and should never be rated as involving more than a very temporary
208
disability.
203. Smith and Cobb, supra note 182 at 217-20.
204. Emotions may be related to the diseases listed as (1) exciting causes of an
attack, or (2) aggravating factors after an attack is started. Both would apply to all
the diseases. A single powerful stimulus has been known to produce an attack in those
marked (s)below although usually a long bombardment with emotional stimuli is needed:
Respiratory system: bronchial asthma (s), hyperventilation tetany (s), Da Costa's
syndrome; cardiovascularsystem: angina pectoris (s), hypertension (s), neurocirculatory
asthenia (s); inuscularand skeletal system: rheumatoid arthritis, tremors and contractures
(s), alimentary (gastro-intestinal) system: mucous colitis (s), peptic ulcer, dyspepsia
and "gastritis" (s); genito-itrinary system.: retention of urine (s), eneuresis (s),
impotence (s), dysmenorrhoea (s); endocrine system: thyrotoxicosis (Basedow or
Graves disease) (s), diabetes mellitus; anorexia nervosa; Integument (skin) : neurodermatitis (s), psoriasis.
205. Smith and Cobb, sipra note 182, at 277, et seq.
206. The adrenal or suprarenal glands, which elaborate adrenalin and discharge
it into the blood stream, are situated above and near the kidneys.
207. For instance, the thyroid glands. During World War II, conditions of thyroid
shock were observed, developing suddenly in certain individuals exposed to intensive
emotional stimulation in combat areas.
208. The term "nervous shock" has been used widely as a convenient shorthand
description of the condition, but it should not be assumed that it involves any injury to
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(5) Serious injury due to fright occurs only when the subject has a
severe, pre-existing impairment of an organ system, or some disease which
can be aggravated by the sudden rise in blood pressure and other physiological
changes induced by the intense emotional stimulation.200 This pre-existing
state of bad health must be forced into the open so that the injury by fright
may be revealed in its true light of mere aggravation. 210
(6) Indeed, in cases of alleged "special" injury exceeding temporary
nervous shock, plaintiff will need to prove this fact of pre-existing susceptibility, and that the stimulus caused injury through physiological responses
which acted deleteriously on the weak link. There is no single mechanism of
injury, and a cause-effect sequence may be scientifically credible in respect to
one type of injury but not as to another.2 11 To answer these questions
plaintiff should be required to support his case by competent medical testimony.
The expert should have to expound the physiological mechanism of causation
and the grounds for his particular conclusions as unreasoned opinions are
worthless. Furthermore, evidence that the injury could result from the
stimulus, is only one step in proving that it probably did do so. Affirmative
corroboration of probable causation is important, and causation by adequate
independent causes should be negatived.
(7) One should remember that most psychic stimuli in civilian life are
short lived, single and not repeated as a bombardment. The result is that
bodily functions of the individual exposed return speedily to normal physiologic responses. 212 This means that one who postulates injury from a psychic
stimulus will need to trace its causation to the limited period of altered physiology. If the individual passes through his experience and returns to a state
of normalcy for a substantial time before any symptoms of injury appear,
the causal connection becomes increasingly speculative and conjectural. If the
psychic stimulus actually caused the alleged injury, we should expect causation to be corroborated by the presence of "bridging symptoms" appearing
shortly after exposure to the stimulus and filling the time interval between
cause and effect. If continuity of causation is lacking and one finds instead
an asymptomatic (symptom free) interval of hours or days, the court cannot
do otherwise than hold that plaintiff has failed to prove actual causation. 213
(8) One exception exists to the requirement of speedily developing
injury but this is apparent only. It is in cases where the psychic stimulus, as
for instance grief engendered by death of a loved one, has a prolonged operathe nerves or nervous system; the latter acts merely as a transmission system in
conveying various impulses which are set in motion by the chain of events induced by
the emotional stimulus.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Smith and Cobb, supra note 182, at 285 et seq.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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tion; here mental reproduction of the shocking experience seemingly produces
cumulative effects. But while some delay may occur before the final injury
appears, one still expects to find interim prostration and nervous shock signifying that the organism has not recovered and this vouchsafes continuity of
causation.

214

(9) In cases of alleged injury from psychic stimuli, one must carefully
investigate the possible responsibility of independent causes. Plaintiff may
have sustained his injury from independent causes, either before or after.he
was exposed to defendant's stimulus. Malingering, also, must be probed
carefully by means of thoroughgoing investigations and medical examinations.
(10) Smith and Cobb found that in 175 of 301 litigated cases studied,
the stimulus was medically inadequate to produce injurious psychic reactions
in an average person; in 125 cases only could it be regarded as probably
adequate to produce even transient nervous shock. In 216 of the 301 cases
there was evidence that plaintiff had subnormal resistance or pre-existing
vulnerability due to poor health or disease. Thus it appears that a majority
of persons claiming injury .from psychic causes possessed sub-normal resistance
to such stimuli. This has great legal significance in tort cases: in every
instance where the stimulus would not have injured an average person,
compensation must be denied unless it can be shown that defendant had
notice of plaintiff's infirmity or idiosyncrasy for otherwise his conduct would
215
not be culpable as involving foreseeable risk of injury.
(11) Some of the alleged injuries which follow psychic stimuli are not
explicable on the basis of physiological reactions, or in terms of physical
injury. We refer to disturbances on a psychological or psychiatric plane,
where plaintiff reacts to the stimulus as a focal experience, this serving as
a nexus around which he develops neurotic symptoms. More than one-third
216
of the cases of injury by fright are really traumatic neurosis cases.
(12) Experience shows that one out of every five or six cases of injury
attributed to fright involves actual or threatened miscarriage of a pregnant
woman. Scientific skepticism must be overcome by flfilling strict criteria of
proof in order to make out a case of traumatic abortion,2 17 so rare is its
218
occurrence.
214. Ibid.
215. Id. at 281 et seq.

216. Id. at 281.
217. Id. at 291 et seq.; Hertig and Sheldon, Minimum Criteria Required to Prove
Prima Facie Case of Traumatic Abortion or Miscarriage, 117 ANN. SURG. 596 (1943),
a study in the National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and
Medicine. The latter authors, pathologists at Boston Lying-In Hospital, studied and carefully analyzed 1,000 consecutive cases of spontaneous abortion seen in that hospital.
They could attribute only one abortion to trauma, though this was a cause frequently
assigned by patients. It is generally believed that violent psychic stimulation is more
likely to cause miscarriage of a pregnant woman than a physical injury to a peripheral
part of her body. TAUssiG, ABORTIONS SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED (1936); Rock,
Abortion, in 1 DAVID, GYNECOLOGY

218. See note 217 supra.

AND

OBSTETRICS, c. 10 (1949).
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(13) One case in five of injury by fright involves transient sickness nonspecific in character (nervous shock). The significant feature of these cases
is the lack of substantial or lasting injury. Ordinarily a plaintiff should not
be compensated for more than one week's disability in this type of case. A
person made sick by nervous shock should be in bed, if at all, within hours
and out again in the course of days.
(14) The requirements of proof of injury from "without" are simple:
a. First, plaintiff must prove that defendant culpably caused a stimulus
to which a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would react automatically,219 or deliberately, 220 usually defensively,2 21 to escape apprehended
injury. Plaintiff must show that his behavior was reasonable in light of the
apparent emergency and circumstances. He must prove that he was caused
thereby to suffer injury "from without" of a type not too remote in expectation of a prudent actor. Whether plaintiff's flight was reasonable is to be
tested by the apparent risk of injury as it existed when plaintiff ran, not by
222
the actual risk of injury as determined retrospectively.
b. The automatic or spontaneous nature of the reaction is important to
continuity and integrity of causation. If plaintiff delays too long and acts
deliberately after leisurely debating alternatives, this may destroy the requisite
spontaneity of response. It may appear that the final action was not taken
in an emergency but that plaintiff indulged in deliberate action at his own
risk. This may introduce a new and intervening cause for which defendant
22 3
cannot be held liable.
c. Proof of actual causation presents no particular complexities as the
traumatic injury occurs during plaintiff's efforts to escape, the time interval
separating cause and effect is ordinarily brief, and the injury sustained is
objective and therefore easily diagnosed and evaluated.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that specialists in internal medicine
and psychiatry will ordinarily be required to substantiate injury by fright;
that here, again, an acceptable opinion can be reached only if the examiner is
thoroughly familiar with the literature of psychosomatic medicine, and is
professionally competent to appraise the stimulus-response factors and the
patient. Finally, he must have carried out his studies to the end of satisfying
the criteria set forth above. There is a grave danger in Psychosomatic Medi1 219.

Gardner v. Newman Hospital, 58 Ga. App. 104, 198 S.E. 122 (1938) ; Warren

v. Boston & M.R.R., 163 Mass. 484, 40 N.E. 895 (1895).
220. Buchanan v. West Jersey R.R., 52 N.J.L. 265, 19 At. 254 (1890).
221. For collected cases, see Smith and Cobb, supra note 182, at 317, app. B4.
222. Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 Atl. 450 (1901).
223. Horton Motor Lines, Inc. v. Currie, 92 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1937) ; Hand v.
Greathouse, 294 Ill. App. 383, 13 N.E.2d 1010 (1938) ; Feck's Adm'r v. Bell Line, 284 Ky.
288, 144 S.W.2d 483 (1940); Peabody v. Northern Pac. Ry., 80 Mont. 492, 261 Pac.
261 (1927); Kardasinski v. Koford, 88 N.H. 444, 190 Atl. 702 (1937); Cherry v.
General Petroleum Corp., 172 Wash. 688, 21 P.2d 520 (1933).
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cine that post hoc, ergo propter hoc224 reasoning may be used and the
witness should be required to document his opinion by allusion to acceptable
medical authority.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY: PRESENCE AND DEGREE OF PAIN

It will be a long while before the last word is said about pain, medically,
and longer yet before an efficient approach is made medico-legally to its
verification and evaluation.
Some courts have permitted experiments before the tribunal intended

to show that the claimant has developed a loss of sensation to pain, an

"anesthesia," as a result of injury.225 But great care must be followed here
for some malingerers can absorb considerable pain without flinching.226
In the more usual case, the complaint is that an injury has produced
great pain and anguish. Problems are presented for careful evaluation by the
internist, the neurologist, the psychiatrist and possibly the psychologist.
As pain is subjective, it is difficult to find a standard by which to judge
its presence and degree. It seems that one may proceed in various ways:
(1) Show, if possible, that the type lesion which plaintiff has suffered
does not cause much pain in the average patient, because the area is poorly
supplied with sensory nerve endings, etc. (or the opposite may be shown).
Here clinical experience affords an objective guide.
(2) The pain from many conditions will have a particular quality (dull,
sharp, fleeting, constant, etc.) or a characteristic radiation to surrounding
areas or organs. Lack of these characteristics may make the complaint of
pain suspect.
(3) Various types of examinations of the subject may reveal whether
he is malingering. Furthermore, it is possible by clinical tests and laboratory
methods, 22 7 corroborated by medical and social histories, to determine whether
the subject is: (1)obtuse or relatively insensitive to pain; (2) average in his
appreciation of pain; (3) prone to feel pain in an exaggerated way.
It would be of incalculable value to courts and juries to know the threshold of the claimant to pain: whether he is hyposensitive (1); an average
224. "After this, therefore because of it." The temptation to put a specific result in
causal relation with some event which preceded it constantly imperils logical reasoning
on problems of causation.
225. Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Campbell, 195 Okla. 323, 157 P.2d 465 (1945) (automobile
accident case: plaintiff, in cross-action, was permitted to demonstrate by use of a pin or
needle that there was a numbness in his leg due to the accidental injury).
226. Woodward v. Longino & Collins, Inc., 155 So. 503 (La. App. 1934) (for facts
of this case, see note 179, supra).
227. One of several methods available is for the examiner to suddenly exert a
squeezing pressure, with his fingers at the base of the styloid process of the patient,
behind and just below each ear. For laboratory determination of the pain threshold, see
Wolff, Hardy and Goodell, The Pain Threshold in. Man, 99 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 744 (1943).
Generally, see PAne (1942); also, note 13, supr.p.
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reactor (2) ; or hypersensitive (3). It is submitted that tribunals should seek
through impartial examiners, to develop this information.
(4) The social and medical history of the claimant, and his work history,
may reveal much concerning his sensitivity or indifference to painful stimuli
and such data should always be checked.
(5) Mental anguish is even more subjective than pain due to organic
lesions and here a psychiatric evaluation of the personality structure of the
claimant, aided by psychological tests, might well show whether the professed
anguish is "in character" or out of keeping with the subject's expectible
reaction pattern. At present, jurors and judges can do no more than guess
at the reality and degree of mental anguish, in the end taking their own
probable reactions to such an episode as the criterion of judgment, or gearing
damages to the degree of defendant's culpability.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF'

ALLEGED NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY: MALINGERING

The defense of malingering tends to be a boomerang if it is not convindingly supported, for it calls the claimant's very honesty into question.228 This
perhaps explains why insurance counsel are slow to set it tip.
If malingering is suspected, counsel should expect to bring out any decisive
exposE on direct examination, through testimony 229 or motion pictures 230
228. This, in turn, may have a great psychological impact on the problem of proof
by arousing sympathy reactions in the trier of fact. See Smith, Components of Proof in
Legal Proceedings, 51 YA.a L.J. 537 (1942).
Aside from psychological repercussions, it widens greatly the scope of permissible
argument to the jury. It has been held that it warrants argument by plaintiff's counsel
that defendant has branded plaintiff as an impostor and willing perjurer. Partello v.
Missouri Pac. Ry., 240 Mo. 122, 145 S.W. 55 (1911).
229. Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 Pac. 639 (1929) (plaintiff claimed that she
was permanently disabled by hysteria and neurasthenia allegedly caused by an automobile
accident; defendant proved that she was able to travel several hundred miles per day ill
making long automobile trips); Klein v. Medical Bldg. Realty Co., 147 So. 122 (La.
App. 1933) (plaintiff allegedly suffered from continuous hysterical tremors; defendant's
office manager testified that he saw plaintiff walk in traffic in a composed manner entirely free of tremors) ; Johnson v. Great Northern Ry., 107 Minn. 285, 119 N. W. 1061
(1909) (plaintiff was seen frequently doing work which he testified he could not do
since the accident). In Weissman v. Wells, 306 Mo. 82, 267 S.W. 400 (1924), where plaintiff complained of intermittent loss of her voice allegedly due to hysteria caused by an
accident, defendant was able to show through her physician that he was treating her for
this hysterical aphonia long before the date of the accident. This proof of conscious
malingering was so conclusive that the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Defendant is entitled to have medical experts who have observed the plaintiff's
demeanor and reactions on trial of the case, take the stand and give any opinion they
may have reached as to the existence of conscious malingering. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. v.
Osborne, 95 Ark. 310, 129 S.W. 537 (1910) ; Klein v. Medical Bldg. Realty Co., 147 So.
122 (La. App. 1933).
230. Motion pictures have been admitted in evidence in support of defendant's defense
of malingering. Heiman v. Market St. Ry., 21 Cal. App. 2d 311, 69 P.2d 178 (1937);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 190 Miss. 53, 199 So. 289 (1940) ; Snyder v.
American Car and F. Co., 322 Mo. 147, 14 S.W.2d 603 (1929) ; Riboletti v. U.S. Engineers
& Constructors, 18 N.J. Misc. 219, 12 A.2d 251 (Dep't Labor 1940) (Workmen's Compensation case involving traumatic neurosis) ; Boyarsky v. G.A. Zimmerman Corp., 240
App. Div. 361, 270 N.Y. Supp. 134 (1st Dep't 1934).
As to conditions which should be established by testimony to make such pictures most
dependable, see Kennedy, Motion Pictures its Evidence, 27 ILL. L. Rrv. 424 (1932) ; and
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proving that claimant has the functions he professes to have lost and so is
not disabled.
The objective should be to subject the claimant to impartial medical
examination by a specialist if this can be accomplished under the law of the
jurisdiction or by agreement of parties. There is. now a well developed
23
methodology for detecting simulation of nervous and mental disease. '
Counsel and medical examiner should both familiarize themselves thoroughly
with the techniques, tests and instrumentalities available for detection of
deception.
Dr. Keschner's brilliant monograph on "Simulation of Nervous and
Mental Disease," 232 in our opinion is an epochal contribution to Legal Medicine as it assembles the scientific techniques available for uncovering simulation of each particular nervous and mental condition and in a manner equally
useful to the medical specialist and the lawyer intent upon preparing direct
and cross-examination calculated to expose malingering. Only an example or
two can be given of the scientific rationale which underlies the study of
malingering. In general, this depends upon exploiting the subject's ignorance
of the human body, of the nervous system and of the symptomatology and
clinical progression df the particular disorder he claims to have. Thus a
layman, unaware that the motor tracts cross in passing from brain to spinal
cord, may pretend to be paralyzed on the right side of his body because of
an alleged injury to the right side of his head, not realizing that any resulting
paralysis would normally be on the left (or opposite) side of the body. The
layman will not know the anatomic distribution of various nerves. The
symptoms he feigns may be wholly unlike those characteristic of the disorder
he professes to have. Special instruments may be .used so that when he
thinks he is seeing with his left eye, he is really using his right, and it may
thus be proven that he has vision in an eye in which he claims to be blind.
On cross-examination, plaintiff's expert might be asked what examinations, if any, he has carried out to eliminate risks of malingering. The
examiner may well have failed to do what is necessary in this regard. He
may admit that should independent evidence show that plaintiff can perform
certain acts, then both his diagnosis and prognosis must be in error, and the
patient's representations false. Such a preparation is excellent for decisive
proof of malingering by independent evidence such as unimpeachable eyewitnesses or motion pictures.
MT. L. REv. 173 (1946), a
study in the National Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations-of Law and Medicine
(2d ser.).
231. Keschner, Simulation of Nervous and Mental Disease, 44 Micr.-L. REV. 715

see particularly Scott, Medicolegal Photography, 18 Rocxy
(1946), also in 103 J.

NERV. AND MENT.

Dis. 571 (1946), a study in the National

Symposium on Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine (2d ser.).
232. Ibid.
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STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY: THE TESTIMONY

OF PSYCHOLOGISTS

1. Cross-Examinationin Cases Where Psychological Studies Have
Not Been Made of the Plaitiff
(1) Defendant's counsel should familiarize himself thoroughly with the
valuable auxiliary aids to be had from particular psychological (psychometric
tests), including projective techniques, in the particular type of case. We
have emphasized the necessity for utilizing these aids in reaching a reasonably
scientific evaluation of the effects of head injury.233 Stress the fact that
leaders in neurology and psychiatry accept the indispensability of psychological testing to determine such questions as the fact and degree of intellectual
impairment, personality changes, the organic or neurotic basis of symptoms,
234
indeed many questions involving both diagnosis and prognosis.
It is our sincere belief that in a medico-legal millennium yet to come, when
all the aids of science may be freely applied to the study of serious medicolegal disabilities, research and clinical psychologists will be systematically
employed in the evaluation process.
(2) Efforts should be made by the defendant to procure impartial
psychological studies of the claimant in advance of trial. At the trial the
plaintiff's medical experts should be required to say whether they regard
such tests as those made necessary or valuable, or unnecessary and useless.
If the former is admitted, seek to discredit the witness for failing to employ
them in arriving at his diagnosis and prognosis; if he scoffs at the clinical
psychologist, force him to admit that he is going counter to the opinion of
235
leading psychiatrists, neurologists, clinics, institutes and hospitals.

2. Cross-Examination in Cases Where Psychological Testinony
Is Profferred by the Plaintiff
(1) The cross-examiner should scrutinize the professional qualifications
of the proposed witness. Courts should take notice that many pseudo-experts,
with little or no scientific competency, have infiltrated the behavior field.
Determine whether the witness has met the rigid standards for qualified
23 0
clinical psychologists set up by the American Psychological Association.
233. See discussion of head injuries, ante.
234. Ibid. At present, such testing is used to aid and corroborate clinical studies,
not to replace them. The psychologist is not, properly speaking, entering upon the
practice of medicine but illuminating special factual questions for his medical associates
through the application of his special scientific techniques.
235. THE RELATION OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY TO PSYCHIATRY (Committee on
Clinical Psychology of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Report No.

10, 1949).
236. Ibid.
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(2) The attorney should familiarize himself with "The Uses and
Abuses of Psychometric Tests, ' 2 37 thereafter associating a skilled clinical
psychologist for the purpose of developing a searching direct and crossexamination. There are many psychological tests and techniques adapted to
various purposes; a standard psychometric procedure may, therefore, have
no real value or applicability in solving the issues of disputed fact in litigation.
Again, a test may have been used which has not yet been accepted or validated
by psychologists themselves.
As Dr. Hunt points out, for a psychometric test to gain scientific
241
acceptance, it must be valid, 238 reliable,2 39 objective 240 and standardized.
Errors may result from inherent defects in the test, from using it outside
its intended scope,2 42 from giving it improperly or to atypical subjects, from
want of a qualified examiner, and from mistakes in interpretation. One must
carefully probe the degree of subjectivity implicit in the particular test, and
the variability of result produced by the examiner's individual interpretation
or "school of thought." Psychometric tests have been developed which attain
the responses sought without revealing to the subject their diagnostic or
prognostic import and this is a feature much to be desired in medico-legal
cases.

24 3

The cross-examination of the psychologist is a vast and relatively uncharted area. On the occasion of my giving a series of lectures recently on
Forensic Psychiatry in one of our leading Veterans Administration hospitals,2 44 the clinical psychologists on the staff manifested a vigorous interest
237. Hunt, The Uses and Abuses of Psychometric Tests, 35 Ky. L.J. 38 (1946),
a study in the National Symposium of Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and

Medicine (2d ser.).
238. "It should agree with other known measures of intelligence, and this agreement
should be experimentally ascertained and demonstrated as an integral part of the test's
construction." Id. at 65.
239. "It should give the same results with repeated usage. In general it is hard to
see how a test can be truly yalid and not reliable, but most psychologists prefer to treat
these two important attributes separately." Id. at 65.
240. "It should provide for relatively simple, unequivocal answers, the correctness
or incorrectness of which can be ascertained by inspection without subjective interpretation
by the person doing the scoring." Id. at 66.
241. "It should provide for a fixed routine of administration which can be followed
without variation. Improvisation in administration means that the conditions under which
a test is given will vary from time to time and that the results in each case will no longer
be strictly comparable. We thus lose the chance of comparing the individual's performance
with that of others in previous testing situations since such comparison is valid only

if the test is always given in the same way under the same conditions.
"Whether or not any given test fulfills the above requirements can always be ascertained by referring to the original sources describing construction of the test. Most
authors publish an abbreviated statement of such matters in the test manual which accompanies their tests." Id. at 66.
242. Many of these limitations are described in Lynn, Levine and Hewson,
Psychological Tests for the Clinical Evahation of Late 'Diffuse Organic,' 'Netrotic,' anld
'Norinal' Reactions after Closed H7ead Injury in TRAu.%rA OF THE CENTRAL NERvous
Sysmil 296 (1945). This study is a partial report of work done under a contract,
recommended by The Committee on Medical Research, between the Office of Scientific
Research and Development and Columbia University.
243. Hunt, supra note 237.
244. At Gulfport, Mississippi, in August, 1950.
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in the large domain which lies between law and the mental sciences. The
reactions of a trainee in Clinical Psychology to the problems of conducting a
scientific cross-examination of projective techniques which now are being
employed so widely in the study of personality, and nervous and mental
disorders have proved so interesting and the note he prepared on the subject
is so succinct and informative that it is reproduced here.245
245. "In recent years the use of projective techniques has become widespread among
clinical psychologists everywhere. The techniques are used in our great mental institutions,
by clinics and by many private psychiatrists and psychologists. They have gained recognition as an important adjunct in the diagnosis of mental and nervous diseases.
"There are scores of projective techniques presently in use. Tile author of each
usually claims some special advantage, and when their work is demonstrated they become utilized by others. By far the most widely worked with and best known of these
techniques is the Rorschach Ink-Blot Test; other popular devices are the Thematic
Apperception Test, the Bender-Visual Motor Gestalt Test, and various sentence completion techniques, and projective drawing devices. These techniques have the property of
allowing the individual to reveal his true and inner-self without his conscious awareness
of doing so, thus circumventing his usual defenses which are commonly employed to hide
his real self.
"The functions of projective techniques are many. One use they have is to aid in the
diagnosis of mental disorder, helping to decide questions of sanity vs. insanity. They help
materially to delineate nosological category, to aid in differential diagnosis. Along these
lines they may be able to shed light on questions of whether the condition is due to organic
brain damage or is of a functional nature. Among the functional disorders, they can
usually aid in the distinction between neurosis and psychosis and between the various
types of neuroses and psychoses. They are intended to reveal what might be termed
'basic personality structure.' In keeping with this information they may give evidence
as to whether or not the person in the past may have suffered from mental disorder.
"Still further projective devices may afford us leads as to prognosis and prediction
of future behavior and mental states. They are also useful in determination of intellectual
impairment due to functional or organic disorder. Also we can utilize them in giving
indications as to dynamic and etiological (causative) factors. This is an important use, not
so much for the legal profession, but is highly significant in planning treatment.
"We can also detect and evaluate the positive features of personality and use this
data in planning for normal people in the areas of professional and vocational guidance.
"No doubt these devices lend invaluable assistance, but like so many other tools man
has devised, they have their limitations. We must point out that these devices are by no
means fully standardized and all clinical psychologists do not make the same use of them.
So far on the Rorschach, only the F/%, which is a highly important measure in recognizing
insanity, has been statistically validated. Most of the tests have at present clinical validation, are accepted in most clinics and hospitals and are found to be of definite value in
evaluation of personality but, largely due to their newness and the insufficiency of necessary time, they have not been fully statistically validated as in the case of psychometric
tests of intelligence and special ability. Another problem is that they must be used by
well trained, experienced, highly skilled, and ethical professional workers. The American
Psychological Association is setting up rigid standards for qualifying clinical psychologists.
Recognition by the American Psychological Association can assure the public that it is
dealing with a competent and recognized psychologist. The American Board of Examiner.
in Professional Psychology, which is a higher accreditation agency of the American
Psychological Association, requires high standards of professional competency. Those
approved by this group are known as Diplomates and are recognized specialists in the
field of clinical psychology.
"Another limitation worthy of mention is that often results will be affected by the
quality of the relationship between examiner and examinee, perhaps to such an extent
as to distort the true picture or render valueless the data obtained. A high degree of rapport must be established if one is to obtain significant projective data.
"There is another point of caution which encompasses more than just projective
techniques. One theory of personality is by no means universally accepted; there are
numerous theories, and sinces one's interpretation of some techniques is in part dependent
on the examiner's particular system to which he subscribes, the result is that one may
find discrepancies of interpretation among experts.
"A closing note is that projective techniques used by competent professional people,
exercising the proper caution in their interpretations, sticking close to thle data at hand.
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(3) If the psychological test is complicated, or unusual, like the
Rorschach, the defendant probably stands to gain by requiring the purported
expert to explain it in detail to the jury, showing them the paraphernalia used,
as this can become a very searching test of professional competency and sometimes produce doubts, or reservations, in the minds of the triers of fact.
CONCLUSION

We have purposely avoided discussion of the broader strategic aspects
of cross-examination, and of the legal principles which fix its permissible
scope. 240 The spectacular triumphs of cross-examination achieved on memorable occasions by great trial lawyers, more often than not are the product of
long range planning and penetrating knowledge. The crucial need of counsel
seems to be a deliverance into his hands of the key principles which govern
and control the subject of inquiry. Accordingly, we have sought to provide
may provide highly valuable evidence in a court of law in cases where questions of mental
abberations are important issues.
"Sherman C. Raffel, B.A. Clinical Psychology. Trainee, V.A. Hospital, Gulfport,
Mississippi."
246. Cross-examination re plaintiff's prior health, Hofacre v. City of Monticello,
128 Iowa 239, 103 N.W. 488 (1905) (plaintiff's physician testified that P's health
was fairly good at time of accident; it was error to exclude cross-examination intended
to show poor pre-existing health) ; Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 3 A.2d 313 (1938)
(D has an unconditional right, on cross-examination, to explore question as to whether
some of P's present injuries were due to prior accidents; limitation was abuse of court's
discretion). That plaintiff's bad health arose after the transaction in litigation may be
shown by cross-examination of plaintiff's medical witness. Hoey v. Hoey, 53 App. Div.
208, 65 N.Y. Supp. 778 (1st Dep't 1900). Where plaintiff's medical witness has testified
only as to fact of disability, in many jurisdictions cross-examination is correspondingly
confined, and cannot be extended to causation. Baker v. Borello, 136 Cal. 160, 68 Pac.
591 (1902) ; State v. Wilson, 74 W. Va. 772, 83 S.E. 44 (1914). But if plaintiff's medical
witness has expressly, or by inference, stated cause of plaintiff's condition, cross-examination re cause is proper. West Chicago St. R.R. v. Reddy, 69 Ill. App. 53 (1896). On fact
and degree of injury, see Bunch v. Charleston & W.C. Ry,, 91 S.C. 139, 74 S.E. 363
(1912) (P claimed physical injury; D could show by cross-examination it was mental
only-hysteria); Allen v. Lowe, 19 Ohio C.C. 353 (1899) (D can show by crossexamination that P's medical witness was out of city during part of clinical course).
That plaintiff failed to file claims for injury under accident and disability insurance
policies he had may properly be brought out by defendant on cross-examination. Western
& A.R.R. v. Peterson, 168 Ga. 259, 147 S.E. 513 (1929) ; Kulengowski v. Withington, 222
S.W.2d 579 (Mo. App. 1949): McLaughlin v. Massachusetts Indemnity Ins. Co., 85
Ohio App. 511, 84 N.E.2d 114 (1948). But it is not error to exclude cross-examination
as to plaintiff's failure to apply for pension under the Railroad Retirement Act. Hilton v.
Thompson, 227 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. 1950). Defendant cannot cross-examine as to the mere
existence of accident and insurance policies. United States v. Fotopulos, 180 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1950). Nor as to the fact that plaintiff has pending law suits under such policies.
Littman v. Bell Tel. Co., 315 Pa. 370, 172, Atl. 687 (1934). Failure to consult physician is
a legitimate topic of cross-examination. Giraney v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 54 Idaho
535, 33 P.2d 359 (1934); Brazeale v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., 184 S.C. 471, 193 S.E. 39
(1937). Cross-examination challenging disability is proper. State v. Bradley, 134 Conn.
102, 55 A.2d 114 (1947) (showing that plaintiff allegedly incapacitated, made bank
deposit); Atlantic Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Isabelle, 157 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1946)
(showing that plaintiff whose hand was allegedly disabled, signed customary signature)
That plaintiff had to work, though disabled, to support child, may be tested by crossexamination as to whether he did actually support child. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Barham,
204 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). The scope of permissible cross-examination
should be liberal, particularly as to medical witnesses, but cross-examination calling for
hearsay testimony should not be allowed. Smith v. State, 21 Ala. App. 460, 109 So.
294 (1929).
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a rationale, however incomplete, for testing the chain of expert testimony,
link by link, in cases allegedly involving neuropsychiatric disability.
Let no man assume that the last word can or will be said upon the vexatious, but fascinating problems, of the mental and behavior sciences so long
as robust curiosity nourishes the spirit of inquiry. These sciences are still in
their infancy, yet the cause-effect relationships of which they treat involve
chains of causation which are long, and manifold, and oftentimes obscure.
2 7
But this
This the qualified disciples of those fields are prepared to admit
does not lessen our need for their testimonial aid, but rather increases the
importance of bringing to the aid of courts and compensation commissions,
the best professional opinion available, founded upon full and complete study.
He who aspires to guide the arrow of cross-examination to the Achilles
heel of the scientific witness, must, perforce, learn his archery from scientific
tutors. If these remarks serve to stimulate the scientific archery of those
of you who do battle upon the fields of medico-legal litigation, then I shall
be glad indeed!
247. "Psychiatry has not advanced to the point where it is an exact science in the
same sense that physical medicine is an exact science. A physician on the witness stand
is able to declare positively whether or not the defendant has a fracture. He can even
describe its duration and severity in detail. Psychiatry, on the other hand, cannot be so
positive about neuroses and mental illness, particularly when the law is primarily interested in one isolated act, while psychiatry takes cognizance of all the influences
that have come to bear on the individual throughout his lifetime." Excerpt from annual
report of the Institute of Living, Hartford, Conn., reproduced as Lcgal-PsychiairicPrine
Fights, 2 DEPAui BuLL. No. 6 (June 1948). See also Gregg, The Limitations of
Psychiatry, 104 AMt. J. oF PsYcHIAT. 513 (1948). Dr. Gregg is Director of the Medical
Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation.

Lawyers interested in the history of psychiatry will be stimulated by ZILOOno,

HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1941); and by WINKLER AND BROMiERG, MIND,

EXPLORERS (1939). For an excellent short history, see Overholser, Ai Historical Sketch
of Psychiatry, 10 J. OF CLIX. PSYCHOPATH. 129 (1949).

